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Scott Ryan
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Organizations have a unique ability to draw on a large collective of individuals to make
decisions, judgments, and solve problems. With the complexity of work increasing, a great deal
of interest has developed regarding collective leadership in organizations. The term “wisdom of
crowds” has surfaced to describe accuracy that can emerge from a large collective of individuals.
Collective judgments have been hypothesized to be accurate even when many members of a
collective have little knowledge relevant to a judgment. The two most cited predictors of
collective accuracy are independence and diversity of judgments. The current project tested
three main hypotheses regarding collective accuracy. These hypotheses state that a collective
will make judgments that approach zero error, that collective judgments are more accurate when
the judgments are made independently than when the judgments are not made independently, and
that collective judgments are more accurate when those judgments exhibit diversity than when
the judgments do not exhibit diversity. Two experiments involving 33 naturalistic judgments
refuted all three hypotheses. Judgments did not approach zero error, collectives composed of
independent judges were significantly less accurate than collectives composed of dependent
judges, and collectives providing high diversity judgments were significantly less accurate than
collectives providing low diversity judgments. The inconsistencies between the current and prior
research are explained in terms of the narrow range of judgments used in prior studies, and the
lack of specificity in the operational definitions of independence and diversity.
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Wisdom of Crowds: Tests of the Theory of Collective Accuracy
How individuals make collective and individual judgments is an important topic in
industrial and organizational psychology (Dalal et al., 2010). Although leaders may have the
authority to make judgments on their own, it may be more accurate to encompass the input of
subordinates. Leadership research has traditionally focused on characteristics of individual
leaders and live interactions with a small number of followers (Yammarino, Salas, Serban,
Shirreffs, & Shuffler, 2012). With the complexity of work increasing, there has been an
emerging interest in collective leadership (Yammarino & Dansereau, 2008). Collective
leadership approaches involve aggregation of skills and knowledge from multiple individuals
(Yammarino et al., 2012). One of the best ways to make judgments is to rely on a large
collective (Gigone & Hastie, 1997; Larrick & Soll, 2006; Lorge, Fox, Davitz, & Brenner, 1958).
A large group of subordinates may have knowledge that supervisors do not possess on their own,
and this knowledge may be relevant when making a judgment (Hayek, 1945; Vroom, 2000). The
idea of including the input of numerous individuals may have emerged due to a general decline
in elitism and distrust of the opinions of experts, who have been shown to have limited accuracy
(Meehl, 1954; Shanteau & Stewart, 1992; Tetlock, 2005). With the advent of the Internet and
easy access to information, individuals are relying less on the knowledge and opinions of
experts.
Although there are advantages to relying on input from others, some leaders may have
been put in leadership positions specifically because their knowledge and abilities are greater
than those of their subordinates. If leaders believe that their knowledge and judgment ability is
superior to their subordinates, it may be wise for them to make judgments independent of input
from others (Vroom, 2000). Even if leaders believe that they should include the input of others,
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there is still a question of who should be consulted. With modern communication tools, leaders
could potentially query thousands of individuals in a matter of hours by posting a survey online
or soliciting comments through email. With the concept of collective leadership gaining more
research attention (Yammarino et al., 2012), it is important to determine under which conditions
collective leadership leads to desirable outcomes.
Until recently, collective judgment studies have primarily focused on groups that interact
in a live setting (McGrath, 1984; Stasser & Titus, 2003; Steiner, 1972). With the availability of a
new method of aggregation, the Internet, a new interest has emerged in collective judgment.
Collective judgment can be contrasted with group judgment in that group judgment usually
refers to groups that interact in person, whereas collective judgment refers to a judgment that
uses information from several individuals, whether these individuals interact or not. Much of the
interest in collective judgment has been sparked by the influential book The Wisdom of Crowds
(Surowiecki, 2005). The book has been so influential that the idea that a collective can be more
accurate than an individual is often referred to as “the wisdom of crowds.” The current project
draws on literature from several research areas that investigate collective action in order to
formalize the wisdom of crowds into a new theory: the theory of collective accuracy. This
theory of collective accuracy describes the conditions under which collective judgment is
accurate.
Empirical evidence for collective accuracy
The theory of collective accuracy is meant to explain the surprising (Larrick & Soll,
2006) level of accuracy that has emerged from studies of collective judgment. Collective
judgment has a long history in social psychology. Much of the research in this area has focused
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on the role of interpersonal relationships, interaction patterns, and communication in groups that
interact in a live setting (McGrath, 1984; Stasser & Titus, 2003; Steiner, 1972). Some of the
earliest work on collective judgment involved groups that did not interact (Gordon, 1924; Stroop,
1932). The idea of using a large group to make simple perceptual judgments, such as size or
weight, has a long history in psychology. For example, Galton (1907) studied 787 individuals
who entered a contest to guess the weight of an ox. Galton collected the estimates and calculated
the median. The median guess was 1,207 pounds, and actual weight was 1,197 pounds.
Similarly, Gordon (1924) had individuals rank 10 weights from lightest to heaviest. The
correlation between the ranking of the weights and the true values of the weights was computed
for each individual. The average correlation was .41. When 50 different individuals ranked the
weights, and then the average position was computed, the correlation between these average
rankings and the true value improved to .94.
Stroop (1932) replicated and extended Gordon’s (1924) study of ranking weights.
Gordon averaged the rankings of 50 different individuals. Stroop’s study involved a similar task,
but used a within-subjects design. He had four individuals make 50 different rankings each, and
then averaged these 50 rankings from each of these individuals. The correlations between these
averaged rankings and the true rankings were .95, .96, .98 and .98. When individuals made only
one rating, the average correlation was only .41. These data showed that a large number of
rankings, whether provided by the same or different individuals, will be very accurate. In both
the within and between subjects measurements, the values will be accurate for the same reason.
Random error will cancel, and the value will approach the true mean. This is similar to asking
individuals to answer several questions on a scale in order to get a more reliable measure. These
results lead to Hypothesis 1:
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Hypothesis 1: A large collective will produce judgments that approach zero error.
Empirical and a priori knowledge
The reaction to collective accuracy research has been polar. Interpreting these results in a
negative light, Stroop (1932) wrote “Extreme caution should always be exercised in interpreting
data which have been treated statistically that the outcomes of statistical manipulation are not
mistaken for experimental results” (p. 562). Other researchers (Lorge et al., 1958) lamented
“Not until 1932 were the obvious defects of Knight’s so-called “statisticized” technique
criticized” (p. 345). In contrast, in more recent times, these results have been hailed as extremely
important. Page (2007) writes “Many of the specific examples in which collections of people
predict correctly seem almost unbelievable” (p. 177).
Philosophers of knowledge (Moser, 1987) have long contrasted the “statistical” and
“experimental” results referred to by Stroop (1932). Knowledge that does not need to be verified
by experiment is referred to as a priori knowledge. It is mathematical or logical knowledge;
tautologies are a type of a priori knowledge. An example of a priori knowledge is the fact that
anyone who is over 7 feet tall is also over 6 feet tall. This statement does not need to be verified
by measuring individuals’ heights. In contrast, knowledge that does require observation to be
verified is called empirical knowledge. An example of empirical knowledge is the statement
“Everyone on earth is shorter than 8 feet tall.” This statement requires verification by measuring
everyone on earth to confirm that they are less than eight feet tall.
Stroop’s (1932) criticism was that Gordon’s (1924) results were a form of a priori
knowledge and therefore did not require empirical verification. If this were true it would mean
that the results could not have possibly come out any differently, not only in practice but in
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theory. It would mean that contrary results would be literally impossible, such as someone being
both over 7 feet and under 6 feet tall at the same time. This is not the case. It could have been
true that averaging the judgments of several individuals could have resulted in less accuracy. For
example, there could have been some systematic bias that made some of the weights appear
heavier than they were, and this bias could have led the groups with more individuals to make
less accurate, not more accurate, judgments. Stroop (1932) tried to demonstrate the a priori
nature of the results by demonstrating that within subject averaging was just as accurate as
between subject averaging. However, far from being an a priori fact, other researchers have
shown that between subject averaging leads to more accuracy than within subject averaging
(Ariely et al., 2000).
Although most researchers agree that collective accuracy is at least partly a consequence
of statistical rules (Ariely et al., 2000; Gigone & Hastie, 1997), one could argue that this makes
these results more, not less, important. If this result were a basic mathematical fact, it would
indicate that it is extremely robust. This is a benefit, not a detriment, of this research.
Unfortunately, this accuracy is not a certain mathematical fact. If there is systematic bias in the
series of judgments, a judgment will not become more accurate as the size of the collective
grows (Gigone & Hastie, 1997; Larrick & Soll, 2006; Lorge et al., 1958). When this technique
will lead to accuracy and when it will not is an empirical question. If this increase in accuracy
were an obvious, infallible mathematical fact, it should be utilized in every aspect of society;
however, Sunstein (2005) states that both public and private institutions do not rely on statistical
means, but instead rely on deliberating groups.
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Intuitions concerning collective accuracy
The high degree of collective accuracy has been shown to be counterintuitive (Larrick &
Soll, 2006). Not surprisingly, individuals tend to think of averaging as creating an answer of
average quality. Larrick and Soll (2006) suggest that this may stem from the representativeness
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, if one is going to have surgery performed
by an “average” surgeon, one does not think of that surgeon as the best surgeon. This may be
why some individuals do not trust voters, because the “average” American is seen as being of
only average intelligence. However, the research of perceptual judgment already reviewed
(Gordon, 1924; Stroop, 1932) indicates that averaging judgments sometimes adds to the quality
of the judgment. Two types of research highlight this unusual “average is best” idea. Research
(Langlois & Roggman, 1990) has shown that when pictures of faces are combined using a
computer, the composite face is more attractive than almost all of the individual faces. The
average face is actually not average in attractiveness. A similar situation occurs with many
emotional intelligence tests, in which the correct answer is defined as the average of a large
sample of test takers, referred to as consensus scoring (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004;
Mohoric, Taksic, & Duran, 2010; Warwick, Nettelbeck, & Ward, 2010). Again, to be average is
to be best.
Theoretical justification for collective accuracy
The accuracy of collective perceptual judgments may seem surprising because it seems
very difficult to judge the size of an object, such as an ox, exactly. However, this level of
accuracy is a consequence of the Law of Large Numbers. The Law of Large Numbers states that
as a sample size increases, the sample mean converges to the population mean (Grinstead &
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Snell, 1997; Lindgren, 1993). The question becomes: Is the expected value of a judgment of a
large population of guessers the actual mean of the judgment? The answer may appear to be that
human perception is not precise enough to make exact estimates; however, human perception
does not need to be precise, only unbiased. If some individuals are too high, and others are too
low, then all of the errors are random, and cancel. The only case in which a perceptual judgment
may be inaccurate is when there is systematic bias (Gigone & Hastie, 1997; Larrick & Soll,
2006; Lorge et al., 1958). For example, systematic bias would occur with visual illusions, in
which case the population expected value that is approached is not accurate. It may also happen
with certain counterintuitive situations, such as those that may occur in quantum physics or
relativity.
It is important to note that the Law of Large Numbers does not guarantee collective
accuracy. The Law of Large Numbers states that as a sample of events gets larger, the sample
will approach the expected value of a population parameter. In the case of judgments, the
expected value of the population parameter is the judgment of all individuals. Unfortunately, the
judgment of all individuals may be inaccurate, in which case a collective judgment will be
inaccurate. The Law of Large Numbers guarantees convergence on the expected value of a
population parameter, not convergence to the accurate value of a judgment. For example, the
American population believes that the government spends 27% of its annual budget on foreign
aid, but it actually only spends 1% (Brodie, 2012). Therefore, if a very large sample of
Americans were surveyed, the Law of Large Numbers guarantees that the sample would
approach the population value of 27%, but they would be approaching an inaccurate value. In
cases like these the Law of Large Numbers actually guarantees collective inaccuracy.

14
In addition to the Law of Large Numbers, the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet,
1785) also states that increased group size will lead to more accurate judgments given correct
conditions. The Condorcet Jury Theorem considers the case in which individuals are making a
decision between two outcomes and the final decision will be made by majority rule. The
theorem states that if each individual has a probability of being correct above .50, then the more
individuals that vote, the more likely the correct decision will be reached. Another important
assumption of this theorem is that each voter is independent, i.e. not influenced by other voters.
This assumption is in stark contrast to much of the psychology research in group decision
making, in which group decision making is usually studied with groups that interact. The
Condorcet Jury Theorem may seem obvious at first. If everyone is likely to be right, it is good to
have them all participate in the decision. However, note that this theorem will apply if everyone
is only 51% likely to be correct. In this case everyone is almost as likely to be wrong as right,
and yet including more individuals makes the group decision more likely to be correct. This
theorem also indicates that even if a group were solely composed of experts that had a .90
probability of being correct, adding individuals with a .51 probability of being correct would still
lead to an increased chance of making the correct decision. This results in a surprising fact, that
adding less accurate individuals into a collective can make the collective more accurate. This
analysis is similar to the previous discussion concerning the Law of Large Numbers. The
Condorcet Jury Theorem states that as long as there is no bias that would lead to an incorrect
answer, then as the sample size gets larger, the correct answer will be approached.
In the case of simple perceptual tasks that do not involve systematic bias, the answer of
how to create the most accurate solution is obvious: Have as many people involved in the
judgment as possible. The analysis results in a general rule to maximize collective accuracy: If
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there is no systematic bias, but only random error, then simply involve as many people as
possible (Gigone & Hastie, 1997; Larrick & Soll, 2006; Lorge et al., 1958).
Although in theory there may be situations in which a large collective should make a
judgment, in practice it may be difficult to use a very large group. As has been identified by
economists (Clemen & Winkler, 1985), there may be large costs associated with involving
several individuals in a judgment. In the cases in which costs are high, the size of the collective
should be limited.
Selecting based on expertise
The previous sections have demonstrated that there are several advantages to selecting as
many individuals as possible to contribute to a collective judgment. Given a large set of
individuals, most of this research suggests that all available individuals should be involved in the
judgment. However, there is an alternative procedure. A subset of experts could be chosen from
the larger collective, and only the judgments of the experts could be used. It may be an
advantage to include only the most knowledgeable individuals because the random error
associated with their judgments may be smaller than the error associated with less
knowledgeable individuals. A small group of experts may be more accurate than a group of
similar size that involves non-experts because the variance of their judgments may be smaller,
and therefore closer to the true value of the judgment.
Organizations often must choose between relying on a small amount of people with a
large amount of information or a large amount of people with a small amount of information
(Sunstein, 2006; Surowiecki, 2005). Leaders are usually placed in charge of others because they
have greater knowledge, education, or experience. Leaders could be considered to have more
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expertise than their subordinates, and therefore may make more accurate judgments than their
subordinates. Including subordinates with inferior judgment ability may (or may not) lower the
accuracy of the entire collective. As opposed to selecting the entire collective, selecting only
experts from the collective may appear to be the most accurate way to make a judgment.
However, there are several reasons why selecting experts may not be the most accurate way to
make a collective judgment.
The first reason is that experts may not be easy to identify (Shanteau & Stewart, 1992;
Taleb, 2012). Even if experts with superior judgments can be identified, one of the key factors is
how accurately these individuals can be ranked. If the individuals could not be ranked at all,
because their errors are all equal, then there are no experts available to select. If individuals
could be ranked with great accuracy, such that we are certain that the first judge is better than the
second judge, who is certain to better than the third judge, etc., it is more likely that selecting the
top or top few judges would lead to more accuracy than selecting all judges.
Even if individuals could be perfectly ranked on judgment accuracy, collective error can
still be reduced by including less accurate individuals. If leaders make more accurate judgments
than all of their subordinates, incorporating the judgment of anyone else will, by definition,
indicate that they are incorporating someone with inferior judgment. This may seem to imply
that when leaders have superior judgment they should make the judgment without incorporating
judgments from others. However, it is possible that including someone with inferior individual
judgment could improve mean accuracy. This could occur if the leader has a lower error than the
second best judge but the second best judge has an error that partially cancels the leader’s error.
For example:
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Leader
Second best judge
Mean

Judgment
12
6
9

True Value
10
10
10

Error
2
4
1

In this example the leader is twice as accurate as the second best judge, yet combing their
judgment by taking the mean still results in a more accurate judgment. This result occurs
because although the individual error moves from 2 to 4, the error of the mean judgment is
reduced to 1.
The relationship between individual and collective error is represented in the bias
variance decomposition equation. The bias variance decomposition equation describes the
relationship between mean squared error (MSE), bias (collective error), and variance. In this
case bias is represented by the error of a collective; it is the expected value of a collective
estimate minus the true value of a parameter. The relationship between average individual
judgment error (MSE), collective judgment variance, and average collective judgment error
(Bias) can be represented as:
MSE = Variance + Bias2

(1)

This equation indicates that the average squared individual judgment error equals the variance of
the collective judgment plus the error of the collective judgment squared. A simple manipulation
of this equation (Krogh & Vedelsby, 1995) yields an estimate of collective judgment error
(Bias):
Bias2 = MSE – Variance

(2)

Page (2007) describes this as the diversity prediction theorem, and describes the equation as:
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Collective Error = Average Individual Error – Prediction Diversity

(3)

where Collective Error = Bias2, Average Individual Judgment Error = MSE, and Prediction
Diversity = Collective Judgment Variance.
From the previous example of the leader and the second best judge:

Leader
Second best judge
Mean

Judgment
12
6
9

True Value
10
10
10

Error
2
4
1

MSE = (22 + 42) / 2 = 10, Variance = ((12-9)2 + (6-9)2) / 2 = 9, so:
Bias2 = 10 - 9
Bias2 = 1
Bias = 1
This indicates that adding inferior judges, defined as those with judgments with greater errors,
can actually increase the accuracy of the mean judgment, as long as they increase the variance of
the judgments. It is important to note that this will not occur if the errors occur in the same
direction, such as:

Leader
Second best judge
Mean

Judgment
12
14
13

True Value
10
10
10

In this case adding an additional judge increases the error from 2 to 3.

Error
2
4
3
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Additionally, if the judgment accuracy of the second best judge is far inferior, even if the errors
are on opposite sides of the true value, the mean error can then increase, as in:

Leader
Second best judge
Mean

Judgment
12
2
7

True Value
10
10
10

Error
2
8
3

Again, the addition of the second judge increases the error from 2 to 3.
A non-mathematical way of describing this cancelling of errors would be to consider
skills that are complimentary (Steiner, 1972). Although one member of a team may have a
superior ability overall, there may be someone else on the team who has a skill in a different
area. In this case the “errors” of the team members may cancel, and even though a member of a
team may have inferior ability overall, the addition of the person to the team may increase the
ability of the team.
In practical situations individuals are interested in making a judgment before the true
value is known. If the true value of the judgment is already known, then there is no need to try
to estimate it. The previous discussion uses the simplifying assumption that the true value is
known, and individuals can be ranked based on accuracy. However, even before the true value is
identified, in many cases individuals can be ranked based on other criteria. Experience,
knowledge, or skill on previous judgment tasks could be used to rank individuals. These
rankings could be used in place of the rankings of accuracy based on the true value. For
example, if asking employees to forecast future sales figures, one cannot simply use the answer
with the lowest error to forecast the future value, because the event has not yet occurred. If one
is interested in using the judgment of the forecaster with the lowest error, one must use other
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criteria, such as past accuracy. This makes the task of selecting the most accurate individuals
difficult, because it is likely that any criteria will not identify the most accurate judges perfectly,
and therefore rankings of accuracy will be approximate.
It is an empirical question, not an a priori question, of whether errors will cancel when
less accurate judges are added to a collective. One of the goals of this project is to determine
whether the input of others should be solicited even though their judgments may have greater
error. This leads to a series of alternate hypotheses. If errors cancel:
Hypothesis 2A: When ranked from most to least accurate, selecting all individuals will
result in the most accurate judgment.
If errors do not cancel:
Alternative Hypothesis 2B: When ranked from most to least accurate, selecting the most
accurate individual will result in the most accurate judgment.
If errors only cancel for a small set of the most accurate judges:
Alternative Hypothesis 2C: When ranked from most to least accurate, selecting a subset
of the highest ranked individuals will result in the most accurate judgment.
Independence
The previous sections have demonstrated that when there is no systematic bias present in
a collective, collective accuracy will increase as the number of individuals increase. Aside from
systematic bias, one of the most commonly studied factors affecting collective accuracy is
independence (Armstrong, 2001a; Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer, & Helbing, 2011; Page, 2007;
Surowiecki, 2005). Researchers have stated that for a collective to be accurate, the judgments
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made by the collective must be made independently of others in the collective. Dependence is
supposed to be lead to inaccuracy when the judgments are dependent both in terms of statistical
dependence (Clemen & Winkler, 1985) and in terms of whether the individuals in the collective
are interacting with one another (Janis, 1982; Stoner, 1968).
A great deal of psychological research has focused on interacting groups (Davis, 1992;
Esser, 1998; Goodman, 1972; Stasser & Titus, 2003). It is difficult to make any claims about
interacting groups without directly comparing these groups to non-interacting groups. The prior
section has shown that the mean of individual judgments can be very accurate (Gordon, 1924;
Stroop, 1932). Therefore, when comparing interacting and non-interacting groups, the best
comparison may be the mean of several individuals vs. the result of interacting groups. Group
performance is sometimes evaluated by being compared to the best member of the group (Kerr &
Tindale, 2004). However, because the best member of the group is identified after the solution is
already known, this does not simulate real-world performance, in which the true value is not
known before judgments are made.
The idea that a group might not perform as well as the same number of individuals
working separately is called process loss (Steiner, 1972). A great deal of research on process
loss has involved brainstorming (Paulus & Dzindolet, 1993; Paulus, Dugosh, Dzindolet, Coskun,
& Putman, 2002). There is wide support for the result that brainstorming in non-interacting
groups creates more unique solutions than brainstorming in interacting groups (Diehl & Stroebe,
1987; Paulus et al., 2002; Wright & Klumpp, 2004). Explanations for this process loss (Paulus et
al., 2002) include evaluation apprehension (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987), social loafing (Latan,
Williams, & Harkins, 1979), and loss of time due to interacting with others (Diehl & Stroebe,
1987). Process loss has even occurred with the more basic cognitive processes, such as memory
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(Weldon & Bellinger, 1997). Weldon and Bellinger (1997) referred to this as collaborative
inhibition, in which an interacting pair of individuals recalls fewer items than the sum of a noninteracting pair. Recent research (Wright & Klumpp, 2004) has shown that collaborative
inhibition may be caused by the interference of hearing what the other individual has recalled.
Studies of quantitative judgment tasks sometimes indicated process loss, although
interacting and mathematical groups were often found to be equal in accuracy (Fischer, 1981;
Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Gustafson, Shukla, Delbecq, & Walster, 1973). Gustafson and
colleagues (Gustafson et al., 1973) found that the geometric mean of individual judgments was
more accurate than the judgment of an interacting group when estimating likelihood ratios of
individuals’ gender given their height. A cue learning study indicated that group judgments after
discussion were virtually identical in accuracy to the mean of individual judgments before
discussion (Gigone & Hastie, 1993). A study of loan officers attempting to predict bankruptcy
of real-world companies found similar results, with the mean of individual judgments being
almost exactly equal to the judgment of an interacting group of similar size. A study of
forecasting grade point averages using subjective probabilities (Fischer, 1981) found that
interacting and non-interacting groups were nearly identical in accuracy. Overall, there appears
to be little difference in accuracy between mathematical groups and groups using discussion.
Another common criticism of group judgment following discussion is the phenomenon
referred to as groupthink (Janis, 1972). Janis described groupthink as “A mode of thinking that
people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive ingroup, when the members’
strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of
action” (p. 8-9). Groupthink is a strong form of conformity caused by a lack of critical thinking.
Individuals strive to conform so much that they do not bring new information into the
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deliberation process. Janis suggested that groupthink was responsible for political failures, such
as the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Sunstein (2005) reviews the 2004 report of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that examined the incorrect conclusion that Iraq had
weapons of mass destruction. The report explicitly describes the failure as “groupthink,” and
states that the CIA failed to consider alternative points of view. The CIA actually had formal
procedures to prevent groupthink, such as “devil’s advocacy,” but these procedures were not
followed in this case.
Another result of group interaction is group polarization (Stoner, 1968). Group
polarization occurs when a group decision becomes more extreme after discussion than it was
before discussion. Sunstein (2006) describes a study in which individuals were separated into
groups of individuals who were similar in ideology, either all Democrats or all Republicans. The
groups discussed the controversial issues of civil unions for gays and lesbians, global warming
treaties, and affirmative action. Results showed that individuals had more extreme positions on
the issues after discussion than before discussion. A similar result (Myers, 1975) indicated that
moderately pro-feminist women will become more extreme in their endorsement of feminism
after group discussion. These groups were also shown to be more homogenous after discussion,
with less variability in their beliefs concerning the issues that were discussed. Group
polarization has been shown to be a very robust phenomenon (Isenberg, 1986).
Do all of these negative results imply that group decision making is inferior to individual
decision making? It is important to note the comparisons made in the studies above. Most of the
studies either compared deliberating groups to mathematical groups, or compared groups before
and after deliberation. Overall, research has shown that group judgments, whether involving
discussion or not, vastly outperform individual judgments (Armstrong, 2001a; Gigone & Hastie,
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1993; Gustafson et al., 1973; Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Lorge et al., 1958; Paulus et al.,
2002). The previous section points to the detriments of group discussion, not collective
judgment in general.
Although a formal meta-analysis may be needed to reconcile the issue of deliberating vs.
mathematical group accuracy, this review does seem to indicate that in the majority of cases
reviewed, collectives that involve discussion will be less accurate than those that do not involve
discussion. This is especially true in brainstorming and memory studies. In judgment studies,
there seems to be only a slight advantage for mathematical groups, with most studies showing no
evidence for either technique displaying greater accuracy. A large number of reviews of the
literature, in various disciplines, have emphasized the idea that deliberating groups are inferior to
groups that do not deliberate. Paulus’ review of brainstorming (Paulus et al., 2002) indicates that
brainstorming produces fewer ideas when done in a group than when done independently. An
influential book on the topic of collective judgment (Surowiecki, 2005), which has popularized
the term “The wisdom of crowds”, states that one of the preconditions for accuracy is that
judgments be made independently. Sunstein’s (2006) work on collective judgment has a chapter
entitled “The Surprising Failures of Deliberating Groups.” Page (2007) proves several theorems
indicating that large groups are accurate, and many of these theorems assume independence of
group members. In a review of combining forecasts, Armstrong (Armstrong, 2001a) writes
“Sometimes forecasts are made in traditional group meetings. This also should be avoided
because it does not use information efficiently” (p. 433).
Although research involving group discussion seems to support the hypothesis that
independent collective judgments are often more accurate than dependent group judgments,
research investigating more structured group interaction supports the opposite conclusion. Unlike
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groups that allow free discussion, many collective judgments are made through highly structured
processes. Computers allow for more structure to be implemented in group judgment, especially
the use of iterative feedback. A popular structured technique is the Delphi technique (Rowe &
Wright, 1996). The Delphi technique is an example in which dependence leads to higher, not
lower collective accuracy. Although there are several modifications of the technique, the general
method is that individuals first make a judgment, then are given anonymous feedback concerning
the estimates of other individuals in the group, and then make another judgment. The number of
iterations can vary, with several rounds of judgment-feedback-judgment. The idea behind the
technique is that because group discussion has been shown to have such detrimental effects
(Janis, 1982; Paulus et al., 2002; Sunstein, 2006), limiting interaction, while still allowing
information sharing, may result in accurate judgment.
Researchers (Rowe & Wright, 1999) have reviewed the accuracy of Delphi techniques
relative to several other methods in the field of forecasting. In contrasting the Delphi technique
to estimates that were simply mathematically aggregated with no interaction, five studies found
Delphi to be more accurate, five studies found no significant difference, and two studies found
Delphi to be less accurate. Comparing Delphi to groups using discussion, Delphi was more
accurate in five studies, two studies found no significant difference, and one study found
discussion groups more accurate. This review indicated that in general the Delphi technique led
to more accuracy than groups using discussion or mathematically aggregated groups.
A technique that emerged from the industrial and organizational psychology literature
that allows information sharing without some of the biases of live interaction is the stepladder
technique (Rogelberg, Barnes-Farrell, & Lowe, 1992). In the stepladder technique, a group starts
with only two members. After these members work together on a problem, others are added to
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the group one at a time. An important part of this technique is that each individual is given prior
information and time to work on the problem before entering the group. This allows for
independent evaluation before biasing can occur from others in the group. The stepladder
technique requires individuals to combine independent knowledge while also facilitating
information sharing. This method has been found to create more accurate solutions than
traditional groups interacting in a live setting (Rogelberg et al., 1992).
Although the Delphi and stepladder techniques have advantages over live discussion, the
most common type of structured interaction is a market. A market is defined as the means
through which buyers and sellers are brought together to aid in the transfer of goods or services
(Reilly & Brown, 2009). The markets that will be considered in the current project are
prediction and financial markets, such as the stock market. These markets are all very similar
because products and contracts are exchanged using a pricing system. Ideally, much of the
information available about the value of an asset is reflected in the price per share of a stock
(Reilly & Brown, 2009). Stock markets, commodity markets, futures markets, and information
markets all use a similar mechanism to aggregate information: prices.
One of the main tenets of economics is not that all individuals are rational, but that
collectives are rational. This idea is associated with the efficient market hypothesis (Fama,
1970). The efficient market hypothesis states that a market is efficient if the price of products
fully reflect all available information. It is important to note that the hypothesis says nothing
about how accurate markets are in general, only that they integrate information in an optimal
manner. There are two more formal definitions of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970).
The first is that the return on investment for a security is only a function of its risk, and any other
fluctuation is random. For example, a very safe bond might only return 2% per year, but a risky
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stock, the price of which varies more than the bond, may return 15%. Another formal definition
of the efficient market hypothesis is that future return values for an investment can only be
modeled by taking the mean historical return and adding random error. In other words, deviation
from the mean return value is simply random. What this means is that no individuals have
special information that will allow them to gain higher than average returns. Although it is
controversial (Gilson & Kraakman, 2003), there is a great deal of support for the idea that most
financial markets are efficient as defined by the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1998; Fama,
1970; Gilson & Kraakman, 2003; Jensen, 1978). Markets are widely considered to be the most
accurate way to make a judgment, and yet market prices emerge from a collective in which
individuals are interacting with one another through the trading process. Therefore markets are
collectives in which individuals make judgments that are dependent on others, and yet they are
considered to be the most accurate way to make a judgment (Fama, 1998; Fama, 1970; Gilson &
Kraakman, 2003; Jensen, 1978). This accuracy is evidence against the premise that
independence is necessary for collective accuracy.
Although it is often stated as a fact that independence is necessary for a collective to be
accurate (Armstrong, 2001a; Lorenz et al., 2011; Page, 2007; Surowiecki, 2005), this review
indicates that the evidence is actually mixed. In some cases dependence leads to lesser collective
accuracy (Janis, 1972; Stoner, 1968), and in other cases dependence leads to greater collective
accuracy (Fama, 1970; Rowe & Wright, 1996).
Mathematical arguments regarding independence
The prior sections indicate an intricate relationship between independence and collective
accuracy, but the relationship is even more complex than has already been stated. Independence
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is considered to have an effect through different mechanisms. Some researchers use the word
“dependence” to indicate groups that interact through discussion (Janis, 1982; Stoner, 1968), but
others consider dependence in a purely statistical manner (Clemen & Winkler, 1985). Statistical
independence is defined in relative terms. Data are not dependent or independent, a datum can
only be independent of another datum. Events A and B are independent if the probability of A
and B is equal to the probability of A times the probability of B (Kac, 1959), i.e., two events are
independent if the occurrence of one event does not change the probability of another.
Statistical dependence can affect collective accuracy in several ways. It is often stated
(Lorenz et al., 2011; Surowiecki, 2005) that dependence leads to lower collective accuracy, or
even that the only way to assure that larger collectives lead to greater accuracy is for the
judgments to be made independently of others in the collective. The general idea behind
independence increasing accuracy is that the quantity of information is higher when individuals
are independent (Clemen & Winkler, 1985). Information theory describes this as the Shannon
entropy of data (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). Dependent data have less information content
because they can be characterized by a simple function. The concept of data entropy is used to
compress files. For example, if a string of zeros 100 bits long is encountered in a file, it can be
compressed from 100 bits into a shorter representation such as “100 zeros.” If a similar string
has a sequence of zeros and ones that do not form a simple pattern, but rather are randomly
ordered, and therefore independent of one another, then the information cannot be compressed.
Independent data therefore contain more information because they cannot be summarized and
represented by a simpler function. Greater information can lead to greater accuracy. Research
involving probability judgments (Ariely et al., 2000) has shown that accuracy increases as the
number of judgments increases, but this increase is greater if several individuals make single
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judgments compared to one individual making several judgments. This difference may have
occurred because more information is available when multiple individuals contribute single
judgments than when a single individual contributes multiple judgments.
The idea of information entropy is important in collective judgment. The amount of
information entropy, and therefore the independence of the judgments from the collective,
determines how much improvement is possible by adding more individuals to the collective
(Clemen & Winkler, 1985). For example, if everyone provides exactly the same judgment, the
data will be completely dependent, i.e. all information can be predicted simply by looking at the
judgment of one individual. Adding individuals to the collective cannot improve a judgment in
this case because the information is exactly the same as that already represented by the
collective. On the opposite extreme, if everyone who could enter the collective has a different
judgment, then it is possible (but not certain) that each new individual entering the collective
could improve the judgment.
Many researchers (Lorenz et al., 2011; Surowiecki, 2005) take this result to indicate that
for a collective to be accurate, the individuals in the collective must be independent of one
another. However, the source that is often cited to support this claim (Clemen & Winkler, 1985)
assumes that the entire collective is accurate. This source goes on to show that assuming all
experts are perfectly accurate on average, more precision will be gained as judges are added to
the collective if their errors are independent of one another. What this result indicates is that
greater accuracy improvement is possible if the members of a collective are independent of one
another. What would actually happen with dependent data, if perfect accuracy is not assumed, is
not known. For example, consider a situation in which the value of pi is being estimated. The
greatest dependence may emerge from a group of mathematicians, who all agree that the value is
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3.14. If non-mathematicians were then added to the sample, they may make independent
judgments, but these judgments would lead to inaccuracy because they do not have the
knowledge that the mathematicians possess. Dependence could be increased in this case by
having the non-mathematicians consult a textbook and discuss what they think the correct value
is. This will lead to more dependence in the collective, but this dependence will lead to more,
not less accuracy.
A recent article (Lorenz et al., 2011) suggests that social influence can “undermine”
collective accuracy. However, the article only indicates that that variance of judgments is
decreased in cases of social influence. The reason the authors state that social influence
undermines collective accuracy is because collective accuracy is supposed to be associated with
higher variance (Armstrong, 2001a; Page, 2007; Surowiecki, 2005). However, their own data do
not indicate that this is the case. The results indicated that the accuracy of the collective
judgments is actually slightly higher in cases of social influence, although the article does not
indicate whether this difference is significant. The assumption in this article is that higher
variance is a beneficial result, but this is a questionable assumption. This is yet another case in
which assumptions take precedence over empirical results, and another case in which is it not
clear that dependence is associated with a lack of accuracy.
The issue of dependence is clearly controversial. Whether considering dependence as
live interaction or statistical dependence, there appear to be contradictory results in both cases.
Several authors (Armstrong, 2001a; Kahneman, 2011; Lorenz et al., 2011; Makridakis, Hogarth,
& Gaba, 2010a; Page, 2007; Surowiecki, 2005) plainly state that independence is a necessary
condition for a collective to be accurate. However, several other researchers (Fama, 1970; Rowe
& Wright, 1996) suggest that sharing information can lead to more accuracy. This conflict could
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be framed in terms of what individuals do with information that is acquired from others.
Information could be used in a positive way to inform a judgment, or could be used in a negative
way to bias a judgment. This leads to two alterative hypotheses. If information sharing biases
judgments:
Hypothesis 3A: A collective will be more accurate when judgments are made
independently than when made dependently.
If information sharing increases the knowledge of individuals:
Alternative Hypothesis 3B: A collective will be more accurate when judgments are made
dependently than when made independently.
The effects of judgment diversity on collective accuracy
The topic of diversity is similar to the topic of independence. Diversity is another cited
prerequisite for a collective to be accurate (Page, 2007; Surowiecki, 2005). However, like
independence, it is not clear whether the diversity of a collective will be positively or negatively
related to the accuracy of a collective. When discussed in the domain of collective accuracy
diversity is often defined in terms of the differences between judgments, as measured by the
statistical quantity variance (Krogh & Vedelsby, 1995; Page, 2007). Diversity is similar to
independence in that both will increase information entropy (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). For
example, if judgments were all equal, both the variance and information entropy would be zero.
If variance were very high, then everyone would have dissimilar judgments, and information
entropy would be high. More information would be available to be incorporated in the
judgment, as is the case when judgments are independent.
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As previously stated, there is a direct relationship between collective accuracy and
variance:
Bias2 = MSE – Variance

(2)

Page (2007) describes this as the diversity prediction theorem, and describes the equation as:
Collective Error = Average Individual Error – Prediction Diversity

(3)

and makes the statement “Being different is as important as being good” (p. 208). After deriving
the same equation, which they call ensemble generalization error, and applying it to results from
neural networks, Krogh and Vedelsby (1995) state “We want networks to disagree!” (p. 233).
Reading these sources and observing these equations, it may appear that as the variance
of a set of collective judgments increases, the accuracy of the collective judgment increases.
However, this will only occur if variance increases while MSE does not change. Unfortunately,
MSE and variance tend to be positively associated (Meir, 1995). When variance increases, MSE
tends to increase. Therefore, increasing variance can increase MSE, resulting in a less accurate
collective judgment. These results indicate that the ideal situation would be to increase variance
of a collective while keeping the average error of all of the individuals constant. Unfortunately
increasing variance can increase MSE, and that can decrease collective accuracy (Meir, 1995).
These equations therefore cannot illuminate what will happen with real-world collective
judgment.
Armstrong (2001) is another researcher who suggests using “heterogeneous” experts
when making judgments. Again this will lead to accuracy, but only if certain assumptions are
met. If the experts being used are of equal accuracy, then higher variance will guarantee higher

33
collective accuracy. This is a consequence of bias variance decomposition equation discussed
previously. The worst case scenario would be one in which all individuals are equally inaccurate
and there is no variance in their judgments. In this case variance would be zero, therefore
collective error would equal the average error. This would mean that collective error could not,
even in this worst case scenario, exceed the average individual error, assuming all individuals are
equally accurate. If the experts were heterogeneous, and their average error were the same, then
the variance would not be zero, and therefore the average collective error would be reduced by
combining experts. All of this again depends on a questionable assumption, that the experts are
equally accurate.
Another example of low vs. high variance estimates involves the differences between
within and between subjects estimates; i.e. a set of estimates made by one individual vs. a set of
estimates made by several different individuals. Taking a typical collective accuracy example,
consider a group of individuals estimating the number of beans in a jelly jar. Due to statistical
dependence, one might expect that 100 repeated measurements from the same individual would
be less varied than 100 measurements from 100 different individuals. Researchers (Ariely et al.,
2000) have shown that between subject estimates of probabilities are more accurate than within
subject estimates of probabilities. This could happen because one individual may have
consistent bias in a particular direction, which may not cancel itself out. However, several
individuals’ bias may occur in different directions, which will cancel. Again, the variance of
between subjects estimates tends to be higher, which can be associated with greater accuracy.
This analysis has shown that the relationship between the variance and accuracy of a set
of collective judgments is an empirical, not an a priori, question. As with all a priori questions,
mathematical results will always depend on assumptions that may or may not hold in the real
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world. Unfortunately, most of the results discussed with respect to both independence and
diversity assume perfect accuracy, although the level of accuracy is the quantity of interest.
Most of these mathematical results suggest that higher variance will be associated with greater
accuracy. However, there are a number of reasons why lower variance would be associated with
greater accuracy.
The Central Limit Theorem states that a sample with smaller variance is more likely to
accurately estimate the expected value of a population parameter than a sample with a larger
variance (Lindgren, 1993). If the population expected value is equal to the accurate value of a
judgment (perfect accuracy), then a smaller variance will lead to more precision. However, the
expected value of a population parameter may not be an accurate judgment value, so this
relationship between low variance and high accuracy will not always hold.
Lower variance may also be associated with greater accuracy because variance may
represent the level of difficulty of the judgment. Take again the example estimating the number
of jelly beans in a jar. If there are only two beans in the jar, we would expect an extremely low
variance from a set of judgments, possibly zero. This low variance would emerge from the fact
that the task is so easy that the answer is obvious. If instead there were thousands of beans in the
jar, we would expect a much higher level of variance because the judgment would be more
difficult.
In summary, there appears to be evidence that high variance of a set of collective
judgments can lead to greater accuracy, but other evidence that high variance leads to lower
accuracy. We are again faced with alternative hypotheses. If variance increases the amount of
knowledge available in a collective:
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Hypothesis 4A: The accuracy of a collective will be positively correlated with the
variance of the individual judgments.
If variance is associated with reduced precision of a judgment:
Alternative Hypothesis 4B: The accuracy of a collective will be negatively correlated
with the variance of the individual judgments.
Forecasting as a judgment task
There are several types of judgment tasks that can be used when researching judgment
accuracy. Forecasting future events is a desirable judgment task because it often has a clear
criterion and is of high difficulty. Forecasting is a common task in industrial and organizational
psychology. Forecasts must be made when selecting or promoting employees, in which future
performance must be predicted. Organizations are interested in forecasting several other events,
such as the success of various products or the general state of the economy. In a recent review of
forecasting results, researchers (Lawrence, Goodwin, O'connor, & Onkal, 2006) suggest that two
of the most important areas for future research are the value of expertise and the effects of
differences in availability of information. As indicated in this review, these two areas have
yielded contradictory results. These are the two primary areas explored in this project.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 tested several of the hypotheses derived from the theory of collective
accuracy:
Hypothesis 1: A large collective will produce judgments that approach zero error.
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Hypothesis 2A: When ranked from most to least accurate, selecting all individuals will
result in the most accurate judgment.
Alternative Hypothesis 2B: When ranked from most to least accurate, selecting the most
accurate individual will result in the most accurate judgment.
Alternative Hypothesis 2C: When ranked from most to least accurate, selecting a subset
of the highest ranked individuals will result in the most accurate judgment.
Hypothesis 3A: A collective will be more accurate when judgments are made
independently than when made dependently.
Alternative Hypothesis 3B: A collective will be more accurate when judgments are made
dependently than when made independently.
Hypothesis 4A: The accuracy of a collective will be positively correlated with the
variance of the individual judgments.
Alternative Hypothesis 4B: The accuracy of a collective will be negatively correlated
with the variance of the individual judgments.
One of the most controversial questions to emerge from this review concerns
independence. The recent trend in large literature reviews (Page, 2007; Sunstein, 2006;
Surowiecki, 2005) is to emphasize the importance of independence in collective judgment.
Letting individuals make decisions in isolation leads to a lack of bias being introduced from
others. This lack of bias is one of the key factors that leads to accurate collective judgment. If
individuals make judgments that are not independent, their errors may be similar, and therefore
not cancel. However, the accuracy of the Delphi technique (Rowe & Wright, 1999) and markets
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(Fama, 1970) may indicate that systematic feedback from others in the collective can lead to
learning and increased accuracy.
Experiment 1 tested the effect of independence by providing participants feedback from
others in the collective as the experiment progressed. The averages of the previous forecasts
were reported to participants as they were making their forecasts.
Method
Participants. Participants were 84 (52% women) undergraduates from a large university
in the northeastern U.S. The most common major course of study was psychology with 10% of
all participants majoring in psychology. They participated in exchange for partial course credit.
Participants were informed that they were not required to participate in the study and had the
right to stop participating at any time. The median study completion time was nine minutes.
Participants made predictions during the early winter of 2012.
Design. The experiment consisted of two conditions, the control and dependent
conditions.
Measures. Measures are described below and displayed at the end of Appendix A.
Demographic and individual difference measures. Participants were asked for their
gender, major, and verbal and math SAT scores. Sixteen other items were measured on 5-point
Likert scales anchored from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Nine items (three per
dimension) were taken from Tetlock (2005) regarding faith in free markets, optimism about the
world economy, and the hedgehog-fox dimension (the extent to which an individual uses a single
rather than multiple theories to predict events). A single-item happiness measure was taken from
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Lykken and Tellegen (1996). Two measures of analytical vs. intuitive thinking styles were
included (Holzworth, 2002).
Confidence. To measure confidence in their predictions participants were asked: “What
is your percentage of confidence in the previous prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to
100.”
Dependence manipulation. Approximately four participants performed the study each
day. In the dependent condition, participants were provided with the mean value and sample size
from all previous participants for each prediction. This manipulation was meant to represent a
dependent judgment in which individuals gather information from others. For example, on the
second day, participants in the dependent condition were told that the average from previous
participants was 1.11 based on 4 participants, and on the third day, participants were told that the
average from previous participants was 2.11 based on 8 participants, etc. For example:

In the control condition participants did not receive information regarding the judgments of other
participants. The experiment was run twice with two different samples so that different running
means would emerge. The first sample was run for six days and the second sample was run for
five days.
Target events. Participants were asked to predict future values of several target events.
The events were chosen to include both high and low difficulty judgments with clear numerical
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true values. Participants were asked to predict one future value for each of the following
quantities (all are for the U.S.A. unless otherwise noted):
•

U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) percentage change

•

China’s GDP percentage change

•

Unemployment rate

•

Retail sales change

•

National average gas price

•

Gold price

•

Number of homes sold

•

Number of unemployment claims

•

The movie The Avengers money earned

•

The movie Men in Black 3 money earned

•

The Dow Jones stock index percentage change over one month

•

Apple’s stock percentage change over one month

•

General Electric’s market capitalization

•

General Motor’s market capitalization
Procedure. See Appendix A for an example of the dependent condition. The study was

performed entirely online. After registering for the experiment on a university website,
participants were emailed a link and told that they had 24 hours to take the survey. Participants
took the survey at the location of their choice. Participants were given a three digit code to enter
when they started the survey so that they could be given partial course credit. Participants took
the survey using the online survey tool Qualtrics©.
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At the start of the experiment participants read an information sheet informing them that
they had the right to withdraw from the study at any time. Participants were then told to enter
the code they were emailed so that they can be given partial course credit. In the control
condition participants were told:
We are going to ask you to make a series of predictions. Please use all of your personal
knowledge, intuitions, and reasoning ability to make the predictions. Please do not look up
additional information as you are making predictions.
In the dependent condition the following was added:
You will be provided with the average response from other participants who have already
made these same predictions. Please feel free to use that information if you wish. It's up to
you.
Next participants were told “When asked for numbers please write only numbers and not
symbols like % or $. Feel free to use decimals or not. You can input positive numbers (like 5.0)
or negative numbers (like -5.0).”
Participants then made predictions and completed all of the individual difference
measures (see Appendix A).
Results
All variables were sorted and examined for outliers. Visual inspection was used to
determine if any values were in the far tails of the distributions. Visual inspection determined
that values that were 10 standard deviations from the mean appeared to very far from the center
of the distribution. Therefore these values were removed before analysis began.
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Computation of prediction error measures. For many analyses participants were
compared on both collective error and individual error. Individual error was measured by taking
the individual judgment, subtracting the true score, and taking the absolute value of the
difference. Collective error was measured by first computing the mean (or for some analyses the
median) of the entire collective, subtracting by the true value, and then taking the absolute value
of the difference. For some analyses absolute percentage error is presented. Absolute
percentage error (Armstrong, 2001b) is computed by taking the error as described previously and
dividing by the true value and then reporting this value in percentage form.
Collective accuracy. Hypothesis 1 stated that a large collective will produce judgments
that approach zero error. Tables 1 and 2 display the true values, mean values, and the error
values from samples 1 and 2. The values do not approach zero error. The mean percentage error
from all target events combined was 691%. The 95% confidence interval ranged from 224% to
1157%, indicating that mean error was significantly greater than zero. Only 5 of the 64 (16
target events x 2 conditions x 2 samples) judgments had errors lower than 10%. Hypothesis 1
was refuted in this data set.
Selecting accurate subsets. Hypotheses 2A, 2B, and 2C presented three options for
selecting accurate subsets of individuals from a collective, assuming that individuals could be
ranked based on some (imperfect) predictor of accuracy. These hypotheses stated that a
collective would be most accurate if either: (A) all individuals were used, (B) the judgment of
the highest ranked individual was used, or (C) some subset was used. In order to perform this
analysis, individuals needed be ranked based on accuracy. In real-world tasks the true value is
not known when predictions are made, so individuals cannot be ranked based directly on
prediction accuracy. For example, in asking 100 individuals to predict U.S. GDP growth for an
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upcoming quarter, one cannot simply select the most accurate individual’s prediction as a
forecast, because the event has not yet occurred and there is no way to know which of the 100
individuals is the most accurate. However, the top individual could be chosen on other
predictors of accuracy, such as how well the 100 individuals have performed on similar
predictions. In the current study individuals were ranked on how well they performed on similar
predictions. Table 3 displays the target event, the similar prediction that was used to rank
individuals, and the correlation between the target event prediction accuracy and the similar
prediction accuracy. Similar predictions were chosen a priori based on the judgment of the
author. If a similar prediction was not significantly correlated with the prediction, other similar
predictions were examined until one was found that was significantly correlated with the
prediction. Predictions that did not significantly correlate with any other prediction were
excluded from the analysis. For example, GM market cap accuracy was not significantly
correlated with GE market cap accuracy, so GE Market cap was not used as its similar predictor.
However, GM market cap accuracy was correlated with U.S. GDP accuracy, so U.S. GDP was
selected as its similar predictor. Once a similar prediction was chosen, individuals were ranked
based on how accurate they were on a similar prediction.
Once individuals were ranked based on how accurately they performed on a similar
prediction, three sets were selected to test Hypotheses 2A, 2B, and 2C against one another. The
three sets were the highest ranked individual, the highest three ranked individuals, and all of the
individuals combined. The three highest ranked individuals were chosen as a subset because if
all possible subsets were tested one of these would likely be the most accurate simply by chance.
Once these three sets were chosen, the error of each group was computed by computing the
absolute value of the difference between the mean collective judgment and true value. These
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error values are displayed in Table 3. A binomial test indicated that no group was accurate more
often than would be expected by chance (33%), p = .53. The strongest form of the theory of
collective accuracy would suggest that the entire collective will be more accurate than any
subgroup in every case. In the current study this would imply that the “all” collective would be
the most accurate in 11 out of 11 instances. The “all” collective was the most accurate collective
in only 18% (2 of 11) of the cases. A binomial test indicated that this 18% accuracy level was
significantly lower than 100%, p < .001. Not only was the entire collective the most accurate
less than 100% of the time, they were less likely to be accurate than either of the other subsets,
although not significantly so. These results indicated that it was possible to select a subset that
was more accurate than the entire collective.
Comparing control and dependent conditions. Hypothesis 3A stated that independent
judgments would be more accurate than dependent judgments, whereas Hypothesis 3B stated
that dependent judgments would be more accurate than independent judgments. Because the
distribution of the variables was heavy-tailed, the Mann-Whitney U test was used to compare the
medians from the control and dependent conditions. Table 4 displays the median individual
judgment errors and the results of significance tests comparing the control and dependent
condition errors for each target event. In 2 cases the control condition was significantly more
accurate than the dependent condition, but in 12 cases the dependent condition was significantly
more accurate than the control condition. Overall, dependence led to more accuracy, but not for
every event. These results were not due to inflation of Type I error associated with multiple
testing. Only 5% of the tests would be significant assuming chance, but 39% of the tests were
significant. The binomial test indicated that this .39 probability of significant tests was greater
than the .05 expected by chance, p < .001 (Brožek & Tiede, 1952; Hedges & Olkin, 1980).
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In order to determine whether the control condition was more accurate than the
dependent condition at the collective level, collective accuracy was also examined. Collective
accuracy differences between the dependent and control condition were tested by first
determining whether median judgments differed in the control and dependent conditions and
then comparing which of the medians were closer to the true value (see Table 5). In 3 cases the
control condition was significantly more accurate than the dependent condition, but in 9 cases
the dependent condition was significantly more accurate than the control condition. As with
individual accuracy, overall the dependent condition was more accurate than the control
condition. These results were not due to inflation of Type I error. The binomial test indicated
that the .33 (12/36) probability of significant tests was greater than the .05 expected by chance, p
< .001 (Brožek & Tiede, 1952; Hedges & Olkin, 1980).
The effect of time. The mean judgments as a function of time and condition and the
correlation between the mean values and time are displayed in Table 6 and Table 7. These
means represent the aggregate mean up to that point in time, i.e. the overall mean for that time
period including all previous time periods. The absolute value of the correlations between time
and the means are high, with 21 of 64 correlations over .90. In both conditions, the means tend
to move towards a specific value. This is likely a consequence of the Law of Large Numbers,
because the running means are becoming closer to the true population value as the sample size is
increasing. This phenomenon represents regression towards the mean. This regression towards
the mean even occurred in the dependent condition, where the assumption of independence was
violated. This result indicates that as more individuals are added to a sample, the sample will
approach the population value even if judgments are not made independently.
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Relationship between accuracy and variance. The primary effect of providing the
mean judgments of other participants in the dependent condition was to reduce variance of the
judgments. Table 8 displays the standard deviations in the dependent condition to the standard
deviations in the control condition. The variance was greater in control than in the dependent
condition in 26 of the 32 instances, and significantly greater in 13 of the 32 instances. There
were no cases in which the dependent condition had a significantly higher variance than the
control condition. Because the dependent condition had both greater accuracy and lower
standard deviation, these data are evidence for Hypothesis 4B, that lower variance is associated
with greater accuracy.
Discussion
Hypothesis 1 stated that a large collective will produce a judgment that is nearly 100%
accurate. This hypothesis was refuted. The judgments from this study were difficult and it is
likely that participants had little knowledge of their values. However, it is important to note that
even if participants had little knowledge of the judgments, the collective could still be accurate.
If the errors were random, they would cancel, and the collective judgment would still be
accurate. This cancelling of error did not occur in the current study. Individuals tended to be
biased by systematically overestimating values in some cases, and underestimating values in
other cases. It is true that if individuals guess “randomly” their errors will cancel and a judgment
can still be accurate, but when making judgments of continuous unbounded quantities, it is
difficult to guess “randomly.” When participants are guessing between discrete outcomes, such
as a coin flip, it may be easier to simply randomly guess one of two outcomes. In contrast, when
guessing a quantity that could take on any value, it may be difficult to guess randomly. Without
random guesses, the errors did not cancel, and the collective was not accurate.
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Hypothesis 2A stated that a large collective would be more accurate than a subset of the
collective, even if those in the subset had lower individual errors than those in the entire
collective. This hypothesis was not supported. The most accurate collectives were those
composed of either the highest or the three highest ranked individuals. Although it is
mathematically possible that adding less accurate individuals into a collective can make the
collective more accurate even if these individuals are lower in accuracy, this did not occur in the
current study. The results regarding the accuracy of subsets were not conclusive, so a replication
will be attempted in Experiment 2.
It could be argued that the reason these judgments were inaccurate is because they were
forecasts rather than judgments of current values. Forecasts may be considered to be of higher
difficulty. However, most of these judgments changed by only a few percent from the beginning
to the end of the study, so simply guessing the current correct value would have led to a very
accurate judgment. Inaccuracy in the current study emerged from not correctly judging the
current value rather than not correctly judging the future value.
Hypothesis 3A stated that independent judgments would be more accurate than
dependent judgments, whereas Hypothesis 3B stated that dependent judgments would be more
accurate than independent judgments. For the majority of judgments in the current study the
judgments made in the dependent condition were significantly more accurate than the
independent judgments made in the control condition. This is likely to have occurred because
these were difficult judgments, and many participants did not have any knowledge of the true
values. They therefore used the information from others as a cue, and this made them more
accurate. The dependent groups also had a lower variance, but were more accurate. This result
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supports Hypothesis 4B, that lower variance in a collective is associated with greater collective
accuracy.
The fact that there were very high correlations between the aggregate judgments and time
in both the dependent and independent conditions indicate that the Law of Large Numbers was
valid even under the dependence found in the dependent condition. This may seem to contradict
the Law of Large Numbers assumption of independence. However, the independence
assumption of the Law of Large Numbers only guarantees validity, it does not necessarily state
that the Law of Large Numbers is invalid under dependence (Birkel, 1988). In the current study
judgments were approaching the population expected value even under dependence. This result
questions the idea that independence of judgments is necessary for collective accuracy, because
it appears that even under dependence a large collective will approach the expected value of the
population parameter.
The results of this study offer a consistent refutation to the theory of collective accuracy.
All four hypotheses suggested by the theory of collective accuracy were refuted. The collective
did not display an accuracy approaching zero error, a large collective was not more accurate than
a smaller collective ranked on accuracy, independent judgments were not more accurate than
dependent judgments, and greater variance was not associated with greater accuracy.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1 all four of the hypotheses derived from the theory of collective accuracy
were refuted. These were not null results; not only was there no evidence for these hypotheses,
but in all four cases there was evidence for alternative hypotheses. Independence and diversity
have been identified as predictors of collective accuracy (Lorenz et al., 2011; Page, 2007;
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Surowiecki, 2005), such that the collective will be more accurate if the individuals in the
collective make judgments independently and the judgments are diverse. Experiment 1 indicated
that independent judgments were not more accurate than dependent judgments, and diversity,
defined as variance, was associated with less accuracy. What instead appeared to be a predictor
of collective accuracy was knowledge. Many of the judgments in Experiment 1 were of high
difficulty, and individuals may have had little knowledge of the true values. According to the
theory of collective accuracy, a collective in which only a small percentage of the members have
accurate knowledge could still make accurate collective judgments, because the errors of others
in the collective without knowledge could cancel. However, this cancelling of errors did not
occur in Experiment 1. With no knowledge of the true value, the true value did not serve as an
anchor around which judgments would be randomly distributed. Experiment 1 indicated that it
was more important to select a more knowledgeable subset of the collective than to use the entire
collective. When the entire collective is knowledgeable, selecting the entire collective may lead
to accuracy, but if the entire collective is not knowledgeable, then selecting a knowledgeable
subset may lead to greater accuracy. This leads to hypothesis 5:
Hypothesis 5: Knowledge will moderate the relationship between the size and accuracy
of a collective. For collectives with high knowledge, the entire collective will be more accurate
than the highest ranked individual, but for collectives with low knowledge, the highest ranked
individual will be more accurate than the entire collective.
Effects of variance
One of the key concepts in the theory of collective accuracy is that a collective that
produces judgments with high variance is more likely to be accurate than a collective that
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produces judgments with low variance because this variance will lead to a cancelling of error
(Krogh & Vedelsby, 1995; Lorenz et al., 2011; Page, 2007; Surowiecki, 2005). Experiment 1
indicated that this was not the case, but the evidence was not very strong. Therefore, Experiment
2 attempts to replicate results from Experiment 1:
Hypothesis 6: The accuracy of a collective will be negatively correlated with the
variance of the individual judgments.
Selecting accurate judges
If the results of Experiment 1 are valid, and it is important to select a subset from a
collective to make judgments, then the method of identifying this subset is important. The
process of selecting individuals for optimal performance is a major topic in industrial and
organizational psychology. There are several methods available for selecting employees
(Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2010). A large meta-analysis (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998)
indicated that general mental ability is the best predictor of job performance. Integrity tests
added the most incremental validity to the mental ability measure, and work sample tests added
the second most incremental validity. Work sample tests are direct tests of tasks performed on
the job. When work sample tests and mental ability are used in a single regression equation
predicting performance, work sample tests have a higher standardized regression weight than
mental ability. This result indicates that knowledge may be even more important than mental
ability. After accounting for mental ability, the next best predictors of performance are
conscientiousness and job knowledge tests. These results further support the hypothesis that
knowledge is one of the most important predictors of performance in several areas.

50
Performance in judgment is not necessarily the same as job performance, but it is
possible that selecting individuals to perform well on a judgment task is similar to selecting an
individual to perform well on the job. For example, Weaver and Stewart (2011) found that three
measures of intelligence were all significantly correlated with performance on a wide variety of
judgment tasks. It is possible that other factors identified by Schmidt and Hunter (1998) could
be used to select accurate judges, just as they were used to select high performing employees.
Two predictors of job performance, integrity tests and conscientiousness, are predictors of
counter-productive workplace behaviors, and therefore may not predict performance on
judgment tests. This leaves mental ability tests, tests of knowledge, and performance on similar
judgment tasks (the equivalent to work sample tests) as potential predictors of judgment
accuracy. Experiment 1 suggested that knowledge may be the best predictor of collective
accuracy. It is difficult to make a judgment without the requisite knowledge. Following
knowledge, the second best predictor suggested by previous studies (Onkal, Yates, SimgaMugan, & Oztin, 2003) is how well individuals performed on similar judgments. This is a direct,
parsimonious way of detecting skill. If someone has performed well in the past, it is reasonable
to suggest that they may also perform well in the future. Experiment 1 indicated that confidence
does appear to be a valid indicator of judgment accuracy, but may not be as predictive as
knowledge or prior performance. These facts lead to:
Hypothesis 7: The best predictors of judgment accuracy will be, in the following order:
Knowledge of the domain being forecasted, skill on similar forecasting tasks, and confidence.
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Using information cues to make judgments
Rather than diversity or independence, knowledge may be the key to accurate collective
judgment. In Experiment 2 knowledge will be manipulated by varying the number of
information cues provided to participants. Judgment is sometimes conceptualized as a process of
using information cues to predict a specific value or category membership (Brunswik, 1952;
Brunswik, 1956; Hammond, 1955). In artificial intelligence, statistics, and psychology,
information cues are often used to predict an outcome. The idea of using variables to predict
outcomes is behind the general linear model in statistics and the lens model in psychology
(Hammond, 1955). The lens model has been applied in many domains, including industrial and
organizational psychology (Dalal, Diab, Balzer, & Doherty, 2010). The lens model has been
used to study how employees are selected (Roose & Doherty, 1976) and how nurses make
workplace judgments (Holzworth & Wills, 1999).
Forecasting is a desirable task for studying use of information cues because past values
can be combined in several different ways to create varied information cues. For example,
Sanders (1997) provided individuals with 48 prior values of a simulated time series. In one
condition participants were also provided with additional information as to the level of noise in
the data and the trend and seasonality of the time series. Results showed that participants who
received the additional information were more accurate than those who received only the time
series.
A recent meta-analysis (Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008) indicated that across several domains,
individuals could predict outcomes using cues with an average of 30% accuracy, based on R2.
Important for the current project, the meta-analysis indicated that novices (R2 = .31) were more
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accurate than experts (R2 = .24), but not significantly more accurate. Accuracy decreased as a
function of cues used: the R2 for 2-cues was .40, for three cues it was .30 and for more than three
cues the value was .26. This is a common theme in forecasting (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2009;
Makridakis, Hogarth, & Gaba, 2009; Taleb, 2007), that overconfidence and a belief in the
efficacy of complex over simple models leads to inaccuracy. Researchers (Gigerenzer, Todd, &
ABC Research Group, 1999) have shown that simple heuristics can lead to great accuracy.
However, giving participants as many cues as possible may enhance their knowledge, which was
shown to be important in Experiment 1:
Hypothesis 8: Participants given the following cues will rank least to most accurate: 0cues, 2-cues, 4-cues.
In a previous study (Ryan & Holzworth, 2012) providing participants with knowledge led
to increased accuracy. Individuals were accurate at weighing information cues if they were
provided only relevant cues, but were not accurate at determining which cues were relevant.
One way to improve accuracy would be to give participants only relevant cues. However, in
most real-world judgment and forecasting tasks, individuals must decide which cues are relevant
on their own. Professional forecasters tend to study past data in order to determine which cues
are relevant. Therefore, an ideal way of discovering the relevance of cues is to provide a short
time series consisting of cues and outcomes. In order for individuals to carefully consider each
cue, cues should be presented separately for each time period. This presentation of cues
represents a short training sequence in which participants learn which cues are relevant. One
interesting question is how many training trials are required for individuals to be able to identify
relevant cues and properly weigh cues. In general, more learning should be expected the more
trials are presented:

53
Hypothesis 9: Individuals who are given five training trials (five sets of cues and
outcomes) will be more accurate than those given two, and those given two training trials will be
more accurate than those given zero.
Effects of confidence
Aside from selecting individuals and providing individuals with knowledge, another
method to improve collective judgment accuracy is to weigh individuals based on self-reported
confidence. However, for this technique to be valid, individuals must be able to estimate their
confidence accurately. Individuals have been shown to be overconfident in rating their
judgments (Lawrence et al., 2006). This tendency makes it difficult to weigh individuals based
on confidence when combining judgments. One study (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980)
indicated that having individuals think of reasons why their estimate might be wrong led to
reduced overconfidence. This technique will be tested in the current study in an attempt to
reduce overconfidence:
Hypothesis 10: Collective judgments weighted by confidence will be more accurate when
individuals are given instructions on how to accurately estimate confidence than when they are
not given these instructions.
Method
Participants. Participants were 635 (69% women) undergraduates from a large
university in the northeastern U.S. The most common major course of study was psychology
with 6% of all participants majoring in psychology. They participated in exchange for partial
course credit. The most accurate participant from each condition was entered into a random
drawing to win one of two $150.00 gift certificates. Participants were informed that they were
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not required to participate in the study and had the right to stop participating at any time. The
median study completion time was 25 minutes. Participants made predictions during the early
Fall of 2012.
Design. The experiment was a 4 (cues: 0, 2 recent, 2 long, 4) x 3 (training trials: 0, 2, 5) x
2 (confidence method: overconfidence information, no overconfidence information) completely
crossed between subjects design, resulting in 24 conditions (see Table 9).
Prior Knowledge. Before making predictions, participants were asked a series of
questions to assess how much knowledge they possessed concerning the prediction domains.
They were asked:
•

How much does ground beef cost per pound?

•

How much does regular unleaded gas cost per gallon?

•

What was the unemployment rate in percent in August of this year?

•

How many individuals who were looking for their first job were still unemployed last
August (answer in millions)?

•

What is the average yearly GDP growth over the last 20 years?

•

How much is the national average home price?

•

How much did the stock price of General Electric increase per year over the last 20
years?

•

How many touchdowns did Michael Turner score last season (2011 season)?
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Target events. Participants were asked to predict future values of 17 target events. The
outcomes were chosen to include familiar and unfamiliar outcomes. Participants were asked to
predict one future value (and in some training conditions past values) for each of the following
economic quantities (all are for the U.S.A.; each subdomain separated by commas represents a
separate prediction):
•

Ground beef prices

•

Gas prices

•

Unemployment rate

•

Total number of individuals who are unemployed after recently entering the workforce

•

GDP percentage change

•

Home asking prices in the northeast, midwest, south, and east

•

Stock value of 3M, Apple, GE, and Microsoft

•

Average touchdowns per game scored by the National Football League running backs
Steven Jackson, Michael Turner, Willis McGahee, and Frank Gore.
Cues. Most of these data are released monthly. For the monthly data, in the 4-cues

condition the following cues were provided: the value one month previous, the value two months
previous, the average of the entire previous year, and the overall average from the previous 20
years. For example, for ground beef prices:

In the 2-cues recent condition participants were provided the value one month previous and the
value two months previous. For example:
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In the 2-cues long condition participants were provided with the average of the entire previous
year and the overall average from the previous 20 years. For example:

In the 0-cue condition participants were not provided with cues. For example:

Training trials. In the 2-trials condition participants were asked to estimate the
September, 2010 and September, 2011 values before estimating the future value for September,
2012. Following each training trial participants were provided with the correct answer. For
example, in the 2-trials, 4-cues condition the following would be displayed:
First page, training trial 1:
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Next page, feedback:

Next page, training trial 2:

Next page, feedback:
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Next page, future prediction:

In the 5-trials condition participants were asked to estimate the September, 2007, September,
2008, September, 2009, September, 2010, and September, 2011 values during training before
estimating the future value for September, 2012. In the 0-trials condition participants were not
given any prior training trials, they only estimated the value for September 2012.
Quarterly data. Data for some of the prediction domains were released quarterly rather
than monthly. For the quarterly data, in the 4-cues condition, participants were provided the
value from the previous quarter, two quarters previous, average of the previous year, and overall
average from the previous 20 years. In the 2-cues recent condition participants were provided
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the value of the previous quarter and two quarters previous. In the 2-cues long condition
participants were provided with average of the previous year and overall average from the
previous 20 years.
For quarterly data, in the 5-trials condition participants were asked to estimate the third
quarter, 2007, third quarter, 2008, third quarter, 2009, third quarter, 2010, and third quarter, 2011
values during training before estimating the future value for third quarter, 2012. In the 2-trials
condition participants were asked to estimate the third quarter, 2010 and third quarter, 2011
values.
Football predictions. Participants were asked to predict one future value (and in some
training conditions past values) for each of the following National Football League quantities:
Average touchdowns per game scored by the running backs Steven Jackson, Michael Turner,
Willis McGahee, and Frank Gore.
In the 4-cues condition participants were provided the touchdowns from the previous
year, touchdowns from two years previous, player’s career average, and the average of the top 30
running backs from the previous year. In the 2-cues recent condition participants were provided
with the number of touchdowns from the previous year and the number of touchdowns from two
years previous. In the 2-cues long condition participants were provided with the player’s career
average and the average of the top 30 running backs from the previous year.
In the 5-trials condition participants were asked to estimate the average touchdowns per
game for the regular season during 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 before estimating the future
value for the 2012 season. In the 2-trials condition participants were asked to estimate the
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average touchdowns for the 2010 and 2011 seasons. Following each training trial participants
were provided with the correct answer.
Measures. Measures are described below and displayed at the end of Appendix B.
Demographic and individual difference measures. Participants were asked their gender,
major, and verbal and math SAT scores. Sixteen other items were measured on 5-point Likert
scales anchored from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Three items were taken from Tetlock
(2005) regarding the hedgehog-fox dimension, faith in free markets, and optimism about the
world economy. A single-item happiness measure was taken from Lykken and Tellegen (1996).
Conscientiousness was measured with two items from a short measure of the Big Five
Personality Domains (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). The other measures were created by
the author. They ask about control over events, political affiliation, and optimism about the
future (see Appendix B).
Knowledge of domains. Participants were asked on a 5-point Likert scale how
knowledgeable they were of the two domains queried in this study: economics and professional
football. They were also asked one multiple choice question about each of these areas, “What
position does Adrian Peterson play?” and “Which economist first came up with the idea of
stimulating the economy through spending?”
Effort. Participants were asked on a 5-point Likert scale the extent to which they put a
lot of effort into the study and the extent to which the predictions they made in the study were
accurate.
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Confidence. To measure confidence in their predictions participants were asked: “What
is your percentage of confidence in the previous prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to
100.”
Procedure. See Appendix B for a limited example of the confidence information, 4-cues,
2-trials condition. This is not a full sample, it only includes a single target event. The study was
performed entirely online. Participants took the survey at the location of their choice. After
registering for the experiment on a university website, participants were emailed a link and told
that they had 24 hours to take the survey. This email also contained an information sheet
informing participants that they have the right to withdraw from the study at any time.
Participants were given a three digit code to enter when they started the survey so that they could
be given partial course credit and so that they could be awarded the incentive if they made the
most accurate predictions. After all incentives were awarded these codes were destroyed,
resulting in anonymous data. Participants took the survey using the online survey tool
Qualtrics©.
Participants were first told to enter the code they were emailed so that they could be
given partial course credit. They were then asked what type of gift certificate they would like if
they were the most accurate. Participants then answered the questions concerning background
knowledge of the domains predicted.
Because the primary goal of this study is to test whether individuals can be made as
accurate as possible, individuals were given brief information on how to forecast. If assigned to
a condition that was not given cues, participants were told:
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This study is going to ask you to make predictions about the value of certain future events
(unemployment rate, number of touchdowns thrown by Tom Brady, etc.). In some cases you
may learn more after making a few guesses.
If assigned to a condition given cues, participants were told:
This study is going to ask you to make predictions about the value of certain future events
(unemployment rate, number of touchdowns thrown by Tom Brady, etc.). You will be given
a series of variables that you can use to predict that value (see table below). These are all
real data. Your job is to try to use this information, along with any personal knowledge you
might have, to try to predict the next value.
In some cases all of the variables may be useful, in some cases only a few may be useful, and
in some cases there won’t be much of a pattern at all. If there is no pattern at all, it may be
wise to simply use the long term average, because that may be the best guess. In some cases
you may learn more after making a few guesses.
As a simple example, below is the U.S. population in millions:

the guess for August 2012 might be around 314.3, because there seems to be a minor upward
trend.
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Next, based on previous research (Koriat et al., 1980), in the overconfidence information
condition participants were told: “Individuals tend to be overconfident in their estimates. One
way to avoid overconfidence is to think of reasons why your estimate may not be correct. The
gift certificates will be awarded based on accuracy of predictions and accuracy of confidence
ratings. Please rate your confidence carefully.” In the no confidence information condition this
information were omitted.
Next participants were told “Please type your answers into the small boxes on the
following pages. Please just use numbers, do not use symbols like % or $. Please do not look
up any additional information when making your predictions.”
Participants then made predictions and completed all of the individual difference
measures.
Results
Fifteen participants were eliminated after completing only the first 50% of the total
questions or less. Twelve participants were eliminated for participating in the study more than
once. Three participants were eliminated because the majority of their answers were extreme
outliers. All variables were sorted and examined for outliers. Visual inspection was used to
determine if any values that were in the far tails of the distributions. Visual inspection
determined that values that were 20 standard deviations from the mean appeared to very far from
the center of the distribution. Therefore these values were removed before analysis began.
Combining conditions. The 0-cues, 0-trials, overconfidence information and the 0-cues,
0-trials, no overconfidence conditions were not given any information concerning past values of
the events participants predicted. These two conditions are referred to as the control conditions.
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All of the 22 other conditions were given between 2 and 29 prior values of target events. These
22 conditions are referred to as the experimental conditions. In order to compare those given no
knowledge to those given knowledge, for some analyses the two control conditions were
combined and the 22 experimental conditions were combined and these two combined conditions
were compared with one another.
Accuracy of control and experimental conditions. Table 10 displays mean judgments
and errors for each target event as a function of the combined control and combined
experimental conditions. As in Experiment 1, participants given no information (the control
conditions) did not approach 0% error. The mean percentage error from all target events
combined was 573% for the control condition. The 95% confidence interval ranged from 129%
to 1017%, indicating that mean error was significantly greater than zero. In the experimental
conditions, the mean percentage error was much lower, at 41%. At the mean, the experimental
conditions were 14 times more accurate than the control conditions. The strongest form of the
collective accuracy hypothesis would suggest that the accuracy of a random collective of
individuals would be equal to the accuracy of a collective of individuals who are provided
knowledge to aid judgment. At the collective level, for 11 out of 16 events the control group was
significantly less accurate than the experimental groups at the p < .05 level. This is consistent
with the idea that knowledge, rather than independence or diversity, is an important predictor of
collective accuracy.
Selecting accurate subsets. Hypothesis 5 stated that knowledge will moderate the
relationship between the size and accuracy of a collective. For collectives with high knowledge,
the entire collective will be more accurate than the highest ranked individual, but for collectives
with low knowledge, the highest ranked individual will be more accurate than the entire
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collective. For this analysis the two control conditions were combined and the 22 experimental
conditions were combined and these two combined conditions were compared with one another.
As in Experiment 1, individuals were ranked based on accuracy on similar predictions (see
Experiment 1 results section). For the current experiment, similar predictions were only used if
the similar prediction significantly correlated with the prediction in both the combined control
and combined experimental conditions. Replicating the procedure in Experiment 1, accuracy
was computed for the highest ranked individual, highest three ranked individuals, and the entire
collective.
Table 11 displays the similar prediction used to rank judgment accuracy, the correlation
between the target event accuracy and the similar prediction accuracy, and the collective errors
for the highest, highest three, and all participants in the control and experimental conditions.
Replicating the analysis from Experiment 1, the accuracy levels were compared for the highest
ranked individual, the highest three ranked, and all participants in that condition. In the control
condition, there is an advantage to selecting more accurate individuals to be included in the
judgment. There was only 1 of 15 cases in which the entire collective was more accurate than
the highest or highest three collective mean accuracies. This result may have occurred because
the correlations between judgment and similar judgment accuracy were high, indicating that
there was a large difference between the most and least accurate individuals. In contrast to the
theory of collective accuracy, the entire collective was rarely more accurate than using only one
or three participants.
As hypothesized, the results were different in the experimental conditions. In these
conditions accuracy was higher than in the control conditions and the correlations between target
event accuracy and similar prediction accuracy was lower than in the control condition, so it
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should be expected that selecting the best performers would not have as much of an effect on
accuracy as it did in the control condition. In the control condition only one of the judgments
based on the entire sample size was the most accurate compared to the highest and highest three
ranked judgments, but in the experimental conditions then entire collective was the most accurate
for 7 of the 15 judgments.
In order to directly test Hypothesis 5, the proportion of times the entire collective led to
the most accurate judgments was compared in the experimental and control conditions.
Hypothesis 5 claims that this proportion would be different in the two conditions, because in the
control condition selecting the entire collective would not lead to accuracy, but in the
experimental condition selecting the entire collective would lead to accuracy. Fisher’s exact test
indicated that these proportions did differ in the control and experimental conditions, p = .04.
The size of this difference was large. In the control condition the entire collective was the most
accurate technique 7% of the time, but in the experimental condition the collective was the most
accurate technique 47% of the time.
Variances and accuracy. Hypothesis 6 stated that the accuracy of a collective will be
negatively correlated with the variance of the judgments. Table 12 displays the individual
accuracy and standard deviations in the control conditions and all of the combined experimental
conditions. For every target event, accuracy is higher for the experimental conditions than the
control conditions at the p < .05 level, but the variance is significantly higher in the control
conditions than the experimental conditions at the p < .001 level. This result indicates that
higher variance was associated with less accuracy.

67
To further explore the relationship between accuracy and variance, correlations between
collective error and variance in each different condition were computed for each target event
separately (see Table 13). Only the experimental conditions were included, because the control
conditions would have been an overly influential data point. Mean errors and standard
deviations were computed for the 22 experimental conditions, and then correlations between
these 22 error and standard deviation values were computed. A total of 7 of the 17 correlations
between error and standard deviation were significant, and all of these were positive. This is
further evidence that low variance tends to be positively associated with accuracy.
With a positive relationship between variance and accuracy, it is possible that an accurate
group may be selected by searching for a collection of individuals with the lowest variance. This
could be accomplished by using the mode value of the judgments from a collective of
individuals, because by definition the mode is a set of values that has zero variance. Table 14
displays the collective judgment error based on the mean, median, and mode judgment for each
of the 17 target events. In the control group the mode was the more accurate than the mean and
median for 71% (12 of 17) of the target events. This value is significantly higher than the 33%
expected by chance, as tested with the binomial sign test, p = .002. In the experimental group the
mode was more accurate in 18% of cases, which is not significantly different from the 33% that
would be expected by chance. These data indicate that in some cases an accurate estimate can be
obtained simply by selecting a subset of a collective that has low variance.
Predictors of accuracy. Hypothesis 7 states that the best predictors of judgment
accuracy will be, in the following order: Knowledge of the domain being forecasted, skill on
similar forecasting tasks, and confidence. Skill on similar forecasts was defined as the accuracy
of the previous year (2011) prediction. Table 15 displays standardized regression coefficients for
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knowledge of the domain being forecast, skill on similar forecasting tasks, and confidence in
forecasts, each with forecast accuracy as the dependent variable. Skill on other tasks is
significant in 14 out of 17 instances, knowledge is significant 2 of 17 instances, and confidence
is significant in only 1 out of 17 instances. Hypothesis 7 was not supported, the best predictor of
accuracy is skill on other forecasting tasks, with knowledge and confidence as weak predictors of
accuracy.
Individual difference measures. Several individual difference measures were included
as exploratory measures. Most of these had low and non-significant correlations with accuracy.
The most accurate predictor of accuracy was the question “I am good at coming up with
explanations for why things have occurred,” which was significantly (p < .05) correlated with
two prediction domain accuracy measures in the experimental condition and three prediction
domain accuracy measures in the control condition.
Use of information cues. In order to test Hypotheses 8 and 9 regarding group
differences, the 17 individual forecasting accuracy scores were standardized and then averaged.
First each individual judgment was subtracted from the true score and the absolute value was
taken to create an individual accuracy score for each of the 17 target events. These 17 accuracy
scores were then standardized separately so that each score would be scaled in a similar manner
before they were averaged. Finally the 17 standardized accuracy scores were averaged using the
arithmetic mean to create one overall accuracy score per participant. The means of these overall
accuracy scores as a function of condition are displayed in Table 16. A 3 (trials: 0, 2, 5) x 4
(cues: zero, 2 recent, 2 long, 4) x 2 (overconfidence information, no overconfidence information)
ANOVA was performed on the standardized average accuracy scores. The results of the
ANOVA are displayed in Table 17. Because variances in the groups were heterogeneous, as
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indicated by Levene’s test, F(23, 573) = 37.43, p < .001, the inverse of the variance of each
condition was used as a weight in weighted least squares (Moder, 2010).
Hypothesis 8 states that the following groups will rank least to most accurate: 0-cues, 2cues, 4-cues. The main effect for cues was significant, F(3, 573) = 41.40, p < .001. Planned
comparisons revealed that the 0-cues condition was significantly less accurate than the 2-cues
recent condition, t(573) = 10.79, p < .001, the 2-cues long condition, t(573) = 10.77, p < .001,
and the 4-cues condition, t(573) = 11.08, p < .001. However, the 4-cues condition was not
significantly more accurate than either the 2-cues recent condition, t(573) = 1.50, p = .13, or the
2-cues long condition, t(573) = 1.33, p = .16. In summary, the 0-cues condition was less
accurate than the 2-cues recent, 2-cues long, and 4-cues conditions, but the 2-cues recent, 2-cues
long, and 4-cues conditions did not significantly differ from one another.
Hypothesis 9 states that individuals who are given five training trials will be more
accurate than those given two, and those given two training trials will be more accurate than
those given zero. The main effect for trials was significant, F(2, 573) = 69.05, p < .001. In
partial support of Hypothesis 9, the 2-trials condition was more accurate than the 0-trials
condition, t(573) = 6.28, p < .001. Contrary to Hypothesis 9, the 2-trials condition was
significantly more accurate than the 5-trials conditions, t(573) = 2.08, p = .04. In summary, the
order of accuracy from highest to lowest was: 2-trials, 5-trials, 0-trials.
The ANOVA also indicated an interaction between trials and cues, F(6, 573) = 18.09, p <
.001. This interaction is driven by the fact that the 0-cues 0-trials condition is so much less
accurate than any other condition (see Table 16). With such an inaccurate condition, all mean
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differences involving this condition will be much greater than any other mean difference,
resulting in a significant interaction.
The ANOVA also indicated a significant main effect for the confidence, F(1, 573) = 4.39,
p = .04. The confidence information condition (M = .05) was more accurate than the no
confidence information (M = -.02). This effect was not hypothesized. Hypothesis 10 states that
collective judgments weighted by confidence will be more accurate when individuals are given
instructions on how to accurately estimate confidence than when they are not given these
instructions. This hypothesis only refers to weighted confidence, there was no hypothesis
concerning a difference between the confidence information and no confidence information
conditions with respect to unweighted accuracy. To test Hypothesis 10, participants’ accuracy
scores were weighed by confidence by first summing each participant’s confidence score and
then dividing each score by the sum. This standardizes the score so that individuals who provide
higher mean confidence do not have higher weighted accuracy scores. These confidence scores
were then multiplied by the accuracy score and summed for each participant, creating an
accuracy score weighted by confidence. A t-test indicated that those in the overconfidence
information condition (M = .02) did not display more weighted accuracy than those in the no
overconfidence information condition (M = .00), t(518) = .62, p = .54. In summary, participants
in the confidence information condition were significantly more accurate than those in the no
confidence information condition, but participants in the confidence information condition were
not more accurate than those in the no confidence information condition with respect to
confidence-weighted accuracy.
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Discussion
The theory of collective accuracy claims that a collective will make judgments that
approach 100% accuracy even when most of the individuals in the collective have little
knowledge, because those with little knowledge will guess randomly and their errors will cancel.
Replicating Experiment 1, the results of Experiment 2 indicated that a sample of individuals with
little knowledge, the control conditions, did not display accuracy approaching 100%. The mean
control conditions collective judgments had an error of 573%. In contrast, individuals provided
with knowledge had an error rate of 41%, which is 14 times more accurate than those not
provided with knowledge. This is robust evidence against the strongest form of the collective
accuracy hypothesis, which states that a random sample of individuals, selected whether the
individuals are knowledgeable or not, will make judgments approaching 100% accuracy. This
difference between experimental and control conditions is important because it indicates that
knowledge, rather than diversity or independence, is the best predictor of collective accuracy.
Contrary to the theory of collective accuracy, Experiment 1 indicated that if individuals
can be ranked based on accuracy, the most accurate judgment emerges from the highest or
highest three ranked individuals, rather than the entire collective. Experiment 2 replicated this
result for the control conditions, in which the entire collective made the most accurate judgments
in on only 1 of 15 instances. This may seem intuitive because using the most accurate
individuals should result in the most accurate collective judgment. However, Experiment 2
indicated that although there were instances in which participants could be ranked based on
accuracy, taking the entire collective still led to the most accuracy. In the experimental
conditions, in 7 of 15 tests, taking the accuracy of the entire collective was more accurate than
taking the highest or highest three ranked individuals. This was the first result from either
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Experiment 1 or Experiment 2 that supported the theory of collective accuracy. This result is
important because it contradicts the intuitive belief that once individuals are ranked on accuracy,
we need only take the highest ranked individuals.
Variance of judgments is an important component in collective judgment theory, with
several researchers (Krogh & Vedelsby, 1995; Lorenz et al., 2011; Page, 2011; Surowiecki,
2005) suggesting that high variance is required for a collective to be accurate, or that higher
variance is associated with higher accuracy. In the present study, Experiment 1 indicated that
lower variance of collective judgments were associated with greater accuracy. Experiment 2
replicated this result, with several results indicating that lower variance is associated with higher
collective accuracy. One interesting result with clear practical implications indicated that an
accurate subset of the collective was selected simply by identifying a subset with low variance,
the mode judgment.
Contrary to Hypothesis 7, skill on similar forecasts was the best predictor of judgment
accuracy. This evidence supports the idea that one of the best predictors of performance is
performance on similar tasks. Knowledge and confidence did not predict judgment accuracy
beyond skill on similar forecasts. This may have occurred because skill on similar forecasts was
such a strong predictor that there was little variance left over to predict.
Most of the individual difference measures did not predict accuracy. The best predictor
was the question “I am good at coming up with explanations for why things have occurred.”
This result implies that individuals are valid judges of their own forecasting accuracy. It is
difficult to know whether individuals went into the experiment knowing that they were accurate
forecasters, or observed that they were accurate after completing the predictions in the study.
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This measure was actually hypothesized to be negatively correlated with accuracy, because
individuals often see patterns where they do not exist and are overconfident in the validity of
these patterns (Kahneman, 2011).
The only significant effect of providing cues was that providing two or four cues led to
more accuracy than providing no cues. Providing individuals with more information did lead to
greater accuracy, but the exact number of cues did not appear to significantly affect accuracy.
The number of training trials provided affected accuracy, but not as hypothesized. As claimed in
Hypothesis 9, the least accurate participants were those that performed no training trials, but
contrary to Hypothesis 9, participants who completed two training trials were more accurate than
those that completed five training trials. This is consistent with the idea suggested by several
forecasting and judgment researchers (Makridakis, Hogarth, & Gaba, 2010b; Taleb, 2007; Yates,
1991) that individuals tend to see a pattern that does not exist and extrapolate that pattern into the
future when it would be more accurate to make a forecast that is similar to the last period
observed. Giving individuals more data may have allowed them to see a pattern that did not
exist, which led to inaccuracy. This phenomenon of seeing a pattern that does not exist may also
explain the results regarding confidence. Those who were warned that individuals tend to be
overconfident were more accurate than those who did not receive this information. This
information may have led participants to make more “modest” predictions, i.e. predictions that
did not stray very far from the last available time period.
General Discussion
The primary purpose of this project was to test hypotheses derived from the theory of
collective accuracy. Not only were most of these hypotheses not supported, but alternative
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hypotheses suggesting opposite results were supported. It is important to consider why there was
such a disconnect between previous results and the results from the current study.
The accuracy of large collectives
One of the strongest forms of the theory of collective accuracy suggests that a random
sample of individuals, not selected based on expertise, will display accuracy approaching zero
error (Lorenz et al., 2011; Surowiecki, 2005). The two experiments described in this paper
provided strong evidence that this was not the case. Collectives that were not provided with
knowledge had very large errors, often several orders of magnitude too high or low. There are
several reasons why the current results contradict previous research.
The primary reason why these results did not replicate previous results indicating near
perfect accuracy is because previous studies (Galton, 1907; Stroop, 1932) tended to use a
specific type of judgment task. Studies such as these used basic perceptual tasks, such as
guessing a weight, size, or temperature. These tasks represent only one type of judgment, basic
perceptual judgments of quantities. A representative sample of judgment tasks is required if
results are to be generalized to most judgment tasks (Brunswik, 1956). Taking a very specific
subset of all judgment tasks does not tell us what will occur on other judgment tasks. This is
similar to the argument Gigerenzer (1996) makes against some of the bias and heuristics
research. The bias and heuristics research shows specific examples in which individuals make
errors, but this does not tell us very much about how often individuals will make errors in most
real-world tasks.
Perceptual judgments differ from other types of judgments in several ways. The first is
that individuals often have a great deal of experience making perceptual judgments. For
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example, individuals are likely to have a great deal of experience in guessing the weight of
objects. This was demonstrated in the study in which a collective of individuals were 99.9%
accurate in judging the weight of an ox (Galton, 1907). In the current study estimates of gas
prices were consistently the most accurate judgments, because participants had a great deal of
knowledge concerning gas prices relative to the other judgment tasks they performed.
Kahneman (2011) states that individuals are very accurate when judging averages, such
as the average length of a line, or the number of objects in an array. This ease comes from the
fact that such judgments are performed by “System 1,” the intuitive, automatic system.
Kahneman (2011) states that these judgments are made quickly and easily because they are done
through prototype matching. The intuitive system represents categories as a prototype or a set of
typical exemplars. In the example of guessing the weight of an ox (Galton, 1907), a prototypical
animal is automatically activated in memory, and this prototype is used to guess the weight. This
process is both automatic and accurate, which explains why individuals were accurate at judging
the weight of an ox, and accurate at other perceptual judgments.
This prototype theory (Kahneman, 2011) also explains why collectives may be accurate
for perceptual judgments but not for other types of judgments. Perceptual judgments easily
activate a prototype because individuals commonly encounter objects such as large animals. For
the judgments made in the current study, such as GDP, no relevant prototype is activated. It is
difficult to imagine that individuals without knowledge of GDP could store a “prototypical
GDP.” A hypothesis for future research is that collective judgments will only be accurate when
a relevant, accurate prototype is activated.
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Another way in which perceptual judgments are unique is that almost all of the
information that is required to make an accurate judgment is provided. When forecasting future
values of a quantity such as the unemployment rate, individuals do not have enough information
to make an accurate forecast (Makridakis et al., 2010b). Individuals would have to know how
many people are unemployed and divide that by the working population in the U.S. Before this
information is released, no individual outside of the U.S. Department of Labor has this
information. Even professional economists make very poor judgments concerning future values
of economic indicators (Taleb, 2012). In contrast, merely looking at an ox will provide almost
all of the information necessary to make an accurate judgment. The sensory cues, combined
with past knowledge of how much animals of similar size weigh, is enough information to make
an accurate judgment. In perceptual tasks almost all the information that individuals need to
make the judgment are available to the individuals, but in many other tasks the information is not
available. Using a large a collective with sufficient information leads to high reliability in the
use of this information, which leads to great accuracy. In the current study, the judgment of
interest was forecasting. Individuals in the control groups in the current study may not have had
enough information to make accurate judgments. Without this information, the errors of the
collective judgments were high.
The nature of perceptual judgments also explains the fact that in previous studies (Galton,
1907; Stroop, 1932) expertise was not required for accurate collective judgments. Given that
individuals will have both experience and information when making perceptual judgments, it is
difficult to find experts who will be better than a novice at making perceptual judgments. Many
of the previous studies of collective judgment involved perceptual tasks for which individuals all
had basically the same amount of knowledge. The knowledge simply came from individuals’
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senses, and in general individuals had experience making these perceptual judgments, so
everyone had approximately equal knowledge. This lack of information asymmetry may explain
why a subset of experts did not have to be selected for accurate judgment. There was no
asymmetry in knowledge, so a more knowledgeable group could not be selected. This was in
stark contrast to many of the tasks from the current set of experiments. In the current set of
experiments there was a large difference in knowledge concerning the judgment tasks. With this
large difference in knowledge, it was important to select a subset of individuals with high
knowledge in order to make an accurate judgment. This was shown in Experiment 2, in which
individuals were all given similar knowledge. When individuals were all given the same
knowledge cues, in many cases an accurate subgroup could not be selected, and the most
accurate technique was to select the entire collective. This result indicated that when individuals
have similar knowledge, an entire collective should be used, rather than a small knowledgeable
subset.
Even if a more knowledgeable subset from the collective can be selected, it could still be
the case that the collective could be as accurate as the more knowledgeable subset. The less
knowledgeable individuals may guess randomly, and these random guesses would cancel.
Although it is an a priori fact that if random errors cancel, larger groups will approach the true
mean of the population, it is an empirical question of when random error will cancel. In almost
all of the tasks in the current series of studies, random error did not cancel. The errors were
systematically biased, leading to inaccuracy, no matter how large the collective. In the current
set of tasks individuals without knowledge did not simply guess randomly around the true value,
allowing their errors to cancel. Errors were systematically biased by either being too high or too
low. Although mathematical theory tells us it is possible for errors to cancel, it is an empirical
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question of how often they actually will cancel in practice. In the current study the errors did not
cancel.
Research on information aggregation often considers information to be a quantity that can
be summed, leading to more accurate knowledge (Hayek, 1945). Adding more individuals to a
collective is meant to increase accuracy because knowledge is increased. Hayek (1945) tends to
think of information as a quantity that can only add accuracy to a judgment. However, what the
current experiments indicate is that adding information to a collective can lead to inaccuracy if
the information is inaccurate. The addition of information to a judgment is often thought of as
being unequivocally beneficial. Both independent judgments and diverse judgments are thought
to increase accuracy, because both processes add unique information and perspectives to a
judgment (Armstrong, 2001a; Clemen & Winkler, 1985; Lorenz et al., 2011; Page, 2007).
However, it appears that researchers fail to consider that even unique information that is added to
a judgment can be incorrect information, and adding unique, diverse information does not
guarantee that the new information is accurate. Cognitive diversity is often praised because it
adds new perspectives to a judgment (Page, 2007), but it is possible that these “new
perspectives” are inaccurate perspectives.
Independent judgments
The most often cited predictor of collective accuracy is independence (Armstrong, 2001a;
Lorenz et al., 2011; Page, 2007; Surowiecki, 2005). Collectives in which individuals make
judgments that are independent of others in the collective are hypothesized to be more accurate
than collectives in which judgments are dependent. The current study not only showed that this
was not the case, but indicated that the opposite is the case. In the current study dependent
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judgments were shown to be more accurate than independent judgments. Some researchers
(Sunstein, 2005; Surowiecki, 2005) consider “independence” to indicate a lack of live
interaction. Live interaction can lead to inaccuracy through group polarization (Stoner, 1968)
and groupthink (Janis, 1982). The current experiments are not relevant to these forms of
dependence because there was no live interaction. Many other researchers (Lorenz et al., 2011;
Page, 2007; Surowiecki, 2005) consider the statistical form of dependence to lead to inaccuracy.
However, these researchers cite a result (Clemen & Winkler, 1985) that assumes that the
individuals being added to the collective have an average error of zero. When this assumption is
true, then adding individuals to the collective when their judgments are independent of other
judgments will increase the accuracy of the collective. However, when the average error is not
zero, then it is not clear what the effect of independence will be. In the current study adding
independent individuals to the collective reduced accuracy because these individuals had an
average error greater than zero, and the error of the entire collective increased. When dependent
judgments were instead added to the collective, the increase in error was smaller because the
average error of dependent judgments was lower than the average error of independent
judgments.
The mathematical reason why independence may lead to accuracy is that independence
creates more information (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). For example, if 10 individuals gave
independent ratings of the job performance of the President of the United States, we could
calculate a mean and state that the sample size is 10. However, if ratings were provided in a live
setting, and nine individuals simply repeated whatever the first person stated, the sample size
would really only be one. Only one independent piece of information would be provided, so the
knowledge of the entire crowd is not being used. This is why it is not appropriate to analyze
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dependent data as if they were independent, because one is essentially inflating sample size, and
therefore inflating Type I error (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Multilevel modeling was
developed to address this issue of Type I error inflation. This is the reason why some researchers
(Kahneman, 2011; Lorenz et al., 2011; Makridakis et al., 2010a; Page, 2007; Surowiecki, 2005)
state that independence is necessary for collective accuracy, because without independence, we
do not even really have a collective at all. If everyone were to simply copy the estimate of one
individual, we have the estimate of an individual, not a collective. However, if the collective is
not accurate, we would not want to rely on the estimate of a collective.
Without independence, the Law of Large Numbers is not necessarily valid, and we will
not necessarily approach the expected value of a population parameter. What researchers
(Lorenz et al., 2011; Page, 2007) who make this argument fail to recognize is that approaching
the expected value of a population does not always lead to accuracy. In the current study the
participants believed that the GDP growth of the U.S. was approximately 33%, when it was
actually close to 3%. In this case we do not want to rely on the Law of Large Numbers because
we would be guaranteed to converge on the mean of the population, but the mean of the
population is not accurate. Imagine asking 10 individuals to estimate future GDP growth in a
live setting. If the first person stated “I just looked up the expected GDP growth yesterday, and
the consensus estimate is 2%, so I will say 2%.” The next person may then think to themselves
“I have never even heard of GDP growth, so rather than taking a wild guess, I will use the same
estimate as the person prior, who appears to be more knowledgeable about this subject than I
am.” If the other 8 individuals simply followed the first knowledgeable participant, the estimate
would be more far more accurate than if they simply went with their initial guess, which
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according to the current study would be approximately 33%. Dependence, not independence,
will lead to accuracy in cases such as these.
Part of the justification for the independence assumption is the following argument: The
Law of Large numbers requires independence, collective accuracy requires the law of large
numbers, therefore collective accuracy requires independence. The error is in the first premise.
Even if the Law of Large Numbers were required for collective accuracy, independence is not
required for the Law of Large Numbers to be valid. The Law of Large numbers assumes
independence, but that does not imply that it is invalid without independence. It only indicates
that if independence is assumed, then it is guaranteed to be valid. It has been proven that under
certain conditions the Law of Large Numbers will hold under dependence (Birkel, 1988).
Assuming that independence is a necessary condition for the law of large numbers is an example
of the logical fallacy “denying the antecedent” (Pirie, 2006). An example of this fallacy is:
Assuming I am a dolphin, I am a mammal; I am not a dolphin; therefore I am not a mammal.
The Law of Large Numbers can be proven true under the assumption of independence, but that
does not imply it is false under dependence.
Based on the differences between dependent and independent judgments from
Experiment 1, the idea that independence is required for collective accuracy appears to be false.
The current experiments have shown that knowledge is the most important factor in collective
judgment. If knowledge is the most important predictor of collective accuracy, then it is not
surprising that dependence led to more accuracy. Dependence indicates that knowledge was
shared, and with knowledge being shared, more individuals will be knowledgeable. Even though
it has been shown that common rather than unique knowledge tends to be shared (Stasser &
Titus, 2003), if some members of the collective begin with no knowledge, then any type of
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knowledge will help them make a more accurate judgment. With a more knowledgeable
collective of individuals, we would expect the collective judgment to be more accurate.
Therefore dependence can lead to more accuracy through the increase of knowledge in the
collective. However, it is important to note that in the current study individuals did not interact
in a live setting. A live setting may have been more likely to produce negative effects such as
groupthink and group polarization. There may be an ideal point between complete independence
and live interaction. This ideal point may involve sharing as much information as possible
without having to interact in a live meeting. Future research is needed to determine where this
ideal point between complete independence and live interaction lies.
Part of the confusion about independence may rely on the causal directions that are being
considered. Based on the current study, if one were told that a collective made a judgment
independently of others in the collective, and another collective made a judgment after sharing
information with the collective, one would estimate that the information sharing collective would
be more accurate than the independent collective. Dependence causes accuracy. However, if
one were told that a collective all came to the same conclusion independently, and another
collective came to the same conclusion after sharing information, one would trust the
independent collective more than the information sharing collective. This result occurs because
independent agreement is strong evidence that a judgment is accurate, because it is unlikely that
all individuals would come to the same judgment independently simply by chance. This is why
coding free responses in surveys is done by independent judges, and the level of agreement of
the judges is reported. Independent agreement is evidence of judgment accuracy, but
independence does not cause judgment accuracy.
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The idea that independence is necessary for collective accuracy has been so ingrained in
the scientific community that several prominent researchers state it as a simple fact. Kahneman
(2011) writes “However, the magic of error reduction works well only when the observations are
independent and their errors uncorrelated” (p. 84). Makridakis and coauthors (2010) state “The
importance of independence suddenly becomes clear when we change the rules of the penniesin-a-jar-game. If we start showing players the results of all previous guesses, the average
estimate will wander further and further from the actual sum of the jar” (p. 208). Experiment 1
did exactly as Makridakis suggested, “showed the results of all previous guesses,” and this lead
to an increase in collective accuracy. The current project has indicated that statements
concerning independence being necessary for collective accuracy may be false.
Diversity of judgments
Diversity is another factor considered to predict collective accuracy. The mechanism
through which diversity increases collective accuracy is similar to the mechanism proposed for
independence. In both cases more information is available to be used in the judgment, and with
more information a more accurate judgment may emerge. However, more information may also
simply make it difficult to select which information is correct and which information is not
correct. The current experiments found repeatedly that high diversity, defined as a high variance
(Krogh & Vedelsby, 1995; Page, 2007), led to less accuracy. High variance may be associated
with high uncertainty or high difficulty, which is associated with less accurate judgments.
In the current study low variance was used to identify a subset of a collective with high
accuracy. Using the mode judgment from a collective was more accurate than using the mean or
median from the collective. This strongly contradicts the idea that high variance is associated

84
with greater collective accuracy. The misunderstanding that high variance can lead to greater
accuracy is further caution of oversimplifying the impact of mathematical formulas. A quick
glance at the bias variance decomposition formula
Bias2 = MSE – Variance

(2)

seems to assure that increasing variance will decrease bias (increase accuracy). However,
greater variance also leads to greater MSE (Meir, 1995), which appears to not only cancel the
effect of greater variance, but completely override it. The increase in MSE is even greater than
the increase in variance, leading to an increase in bias (collective inaccuracy).
As with independence, some of the confusion about the effects of diversity may depend
on exactly how diversity is defined. If one is told that the set of judgments themselves are
diverse, then one would expect less accuracy than if the judgments were not diverse. However,
if one were told that a diverse collective of individuals, who have diverse knowledge, are making
a judgment, then the effect of this type of diversity will be less clear.
Judgment vs. problem solving
Another possible explanation for the mismatch between the current study and previous
studies involves the breadth of the theory of collective accuracy. Many works take a very broad
approach to collective accuracy, arguing simultaneously that collectives both make more
accurate judgments and are better able to solve problems (Page, 2007; Sunstein, 2006;
Surowiecki, 2005). The ability to be accurate and to solve problems are often considered
simultaneously, and even predictive factors such as independence and diversity are considered to
be predictors of both. However, the hypotheses derived from the theory of collective accuracy
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may apply to problem solving more directly than they apply to judgment. A stronger case may
be made for collective problem solving efficacy than collective accuracy.
Research has shown that collectives are more likely than individuals to solve problems
(Shaw, 1932). Shaw found that four-person groups solved 60% of brainteaser problems they
attempted, while individuals solved only 14%. Collectives are more likely to solve problems
because quantity of potential solutions will result in a higher likelihood of solving a problem. If
one were trying to solve an equation, and can easily input values to the equation to test the
solution, then one will be more likely to solve the equation by having as many solutions as
possible. A similar effect occurs with “Eureka” problems (Lorge & Solomon, 1955). Eureka
problems are those that may be difficult, but whose solution is very easy to recognize once it is
suggested. An example of this type of problem is a word puzzle, such as an anagram. With
these tasks, the more individuals that suggest solutions, the more likely the problem is to be
solved. Lorge and Solomon (1962) suggest that for Eureka tasks the probability that a group will
solve a problem is equal to:
1 - (1 – PI)N
where PI is the probability that an individual will solve the problem and N is the group size.
With a group able to produce more potential solutions than individuals, it is more likely that they
will produce the correct solution.
Problem solving is a case in which it is more obvious that a large collective will be
efficacious when the collective is diverse and independent. As long as solutions are easy to test,
one would want several diverse solutions. These solutions may be more diverse when
individuals are working independently, free from the conformity that comes from interacting
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with others. If a collective created several similar suggestions, the chances of solving the
problem would be lower. This basic idea is used in computer science algorithms in which a
difficult problem is faced. In evolution algorithms solutions are changed randomly, simply to
create diversity with the hope that with several diverse solutions the correct solution will simply
be found by chance.
One important difference between problem solving and collective judgment is that often
in problem solving tasks the solutions can be tested in some way in order to determine whether
the solutions are accurate. In collective judgment the situation is often the opposite; whether the
judgment is accurate is the primary question. In problem solving generating a number of diverse
solutions can increase the probability of finding the correct solution, because there are more
solutions to test. In judgment, generating a number of diverse judgments simply creates more
ambiguity and uncertainty about what the accurate value is.
Using a large collective may be more efficacious in problem solving than in judgment.
The success associated with collective problem solving may have been over-generalized to
collective judgment, resulting in an overstatement of the judgment accuracy of a large collective.
Selection of an accurate subset
Researchers (Larrick & Soll, 2006) have shown that it is not intuitive that averaging
results from a large collective can increase accuracy. However, in the current study, there were
several cases in which even though individuals could be ranked based on accuracy, the entire
collective was still more accurate than a knowledgeable subset. In a single experiment, it was
shown that when individuals had large differences in individual accuracy, then selecting a subset
that was more knowledgeable led to more accuracy than using the entire subset in 14 out of 15
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instances. However, when individuals did not possess large differences in knowledge, in 7 of 15
instances the collective was more accurate than a more knowledgeable subgroup. What may
appear to be obvious, that selecting a more knowledge subset will lead to greater accuracy, has
been shown to be wrong on theoretical grounds (Krogh & Vedelsby, 1995; Page, 2007) and was
shown to be wrong on empirical grounds in the current study. This is important because it was
the only result in the current project that confirmed a hypothesis derived from the theory of
collective accuracy. This result confirmed the surprising prediction that adding less accurate
individuals to a collective can increase the accuracy of the collective judgment.
This result also confirms the intuition that it will be important to select an accurate subset
when there are large individual differences in knowledge. In the control group of Experiment 2,
the correlations that were used to rank individuals ranged from .57 to .89. For these judgments,
there were no cases in which the collective was more accurate than a more knowledgeable
subset. In the experimental conditions, the correlations ranged from .16 to .42. For these
conditions, in 7 of 15 cases the judgment using the entire collective was the most accurate.
Although higher correlations made it easier to select an accurate subset of individuals, there was
no simple threshold correlation that determined when the collective would be accurate and when
it would not. In the experimental condition, the three highest correlations, .41, .41, and .42, were
all cases in which the collective was the most accurate. The lowest correlation, .16, was a case in
which a more knowledgeable subset was more accurate than the entire collective. It may not be
possible to simply look at a correlation used to rank individuals on accuracy and use the strength
of that correlation to determine with certainty whether the entire collective or a subset should be
used. However, one should be more likely to use the entire collective when the correlation used
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to rank individuals is low. Exactly how low this correlation should be is a difficult question.
This question requires further theoretical and empirical investigation.
Determining truth
One of the hopes from the theory of collective accuracy is that it provides a way to verify
the truth of propositions. This is especially true in cases of consensus scoring, in which correct
answers are considered to be the answers most often selected by a pool of respondents (Mayer et
al., 2004; Mohoric et al., 2010; Warwick et al., 2010). The results from the current experiments
do not support the accuracy of consensus scoring. A large collective was shown to be inaccurate
in many of the judgments from the current set of experiments. Philosophers have been
considering how to determine truth for thousands of years, and surprisingly, there is general
agreement on how to establish truth. The best way to determine whether a proposition is true is
to use either a priori or empirical tests. A priori tests are logical or mathematical proofs.
Empirical tests are tests that involve observing whether the results are true, such as the process of
experimentation.
Some of the reasoning behind the theory of collective accuracy is that experts should not
be trusted to establish accuracy, but rather one should rely a large collective to determine
accuracy. The results from the current study, combined with other research on expertise (Meehl,
1954; Tetlock, 2005), may suggest that neither experts nor collectives should be relied upon for
accuracy. This has important implications for industrial and organizational psychology.
Whenever possible, a leader should use a priori or empirical knowledge to establish truth. If
these methods are not available, a small group or even single individual that has a great deal of
knowledge should be relied upon. The results from the current experiment indicate that a large
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collective may be the last group that should be relied upon for accuracy. A large group may
suggest solutions to problems, or add knowledge that a single expert may not have, but a large
collective is more likely to be inaccurate than a smaller group with greater knowledge.
However, if a collective can be found in which individuals all have equal knowledge, then as
large a collective as possible should be used.
If a collective is being used, the current series of experiments have shown when a
collective may be more likely to be accurate. Contrary to previous research on independence
(Lorenz et al., 2011; Page, 2007; Surowiecki, 2005), the current experiments have shown that
when information is shared in the collective, the collective may be more accurate. Also contrary
to previous research (Lorenz et al., 2011; Page, 2007; Surowiecki, 2005), a collective should be
trusted more when the variance of the judgments from the collective is low than when the
variance is high. High variance indicates disagreement, which implies that the judgment is of
high difficulty. Low variance indicates that the judgment is obvious, and more trust should be
placed in the judgment.
Although estimates vary, it has been suggested that data stored on computers throughout
the world is doubling at least every two years (Gantz & Reinsel, 2011). It may appear that with
more data available, more scientific and scholarly progress can be made. The idea that more data
are a positive factor is partly inspired by the theory of collective accuracy. With more
information available, more accurate knowledge may be available. Given that the current study
has cast doubt on the theory of collective accuracy, the large increase in data may be worrisome.
Doubling the amount of data may create some accurate data, but it also may create some
inaccurate data. Increasing data may simply make it more difficult to find the accurate data
among the inaccurate data. If an Internet search produces ten results that all disagree with one
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another, it is difficult to determine which of those are accurate. The Internet is often referred to
as a democratizing influence (Lanier, 2013). In the past in order to broadcast to a large number
of citizens one needed access to radio or television stations that cost millions of dollars. This
meant that only professionals with a great deal of resources could broadcast information. With
the advent of the Internet, amateurs can now broadcast information as well. This is sometimes
seen as a democratizing, positive influence (Kurzweil, 1999), but it also makes it difficult to
distinguish knowledgeable professionals from inaccurate novices. If a large collective tends to
be accurate, regardless of their level of knowledge, then this democratizing of information
distribution could be seen as a positive development. However, with the current study indicating
that the collective is often inaccurate, this development may be detrimental.
Applications to Industrial and Organizational Psychology
Implications for collective judgment in organizations. Live face to face meetings have
several detrimental effects. These include groupthink (Janis, 1972), group polarization (Stoner,
1968) conformity (Asch, 1951), and providing of shared rather than unique information (Stasser
& Titus, 2003). With so many negative aspects, it is surprising that organizations focus so
heavily on live meetings for collective judgments and decisions (Sunstein, 2006). The current
study suggests that sharing information, rather than making judgments independently, leads to
accuracy. These results imply that information should be shared, but ideally not shared in a live
setting. The Delphi technique (Rowe & Wright, 1999) allows individuals to share information
without live interaction. Markets also display this ideal mix of information sharing and
independent judgment. This optimal mix may suggest why the Delphi technique and markets
have been shown to be the most accurate forms of judgment (Fama, 1970; Graefe & Armstrong,
2011; Rowe & Wright, 1999). These techniques may have been utilized less than live meetings
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in the past due to their difficulty in implementation, but with the availability of the Internet
making these techniques easier to implement, their use may begin to increase. Another
technique that allows information sharing without some of the biases of live interaction is the
stepladder technique (Rogelberg et al., 1992). The stepladder technique prompts individuals to
independently consider a judgment before discussing the judgment with other members of a
group, and adds individuals to a group one at a time so that each individual’s unique information
is considered. An advantage of this technique is that it is simple and does not require technology
to implement.
Implications for leadership. Vroom (2000) presents a theory of leadership that examines
the conditions under which leaders should involve subordinates in decision making and
judgment. The theory considers many factors relevant to organizational decision making, such
as the importance of gaining support from subordinates, leader expertise, and subordinate
expertise. Vroom (2000) states that when leaders are high in expertise for the particular decision
and it is not important to gain commitment from subordinates, the leader should make the final
decision on their own, with the possibility of gaining some input from others. The final decision
is made by the leader, but the theory does not state under which conditions the leader should seek
input from others. The current study has indicated that this detail, whether to gain information
from others, is a very important and controversial one. The results from the current study would
suggest that leaders should solicit input from others only if they have expertise that is similar to
the leader.
Vroom’s (2000) research suggests that important components in leader decision making
move beyond mere accuracy, such as the importance of gaining commitment from subordinates,
and concerns for development of employee skills by involving them in judgments and decisions.
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The current project only deals with judgment accuracy. There may be cases in organizational
judgment in which individuals should be included in a judgment in order to increase satisfaction
and acceptance of the judgment, even if their inclusion leads to less accurate judgments.
Subordinates should be included if it is more important for the judgment to be accepted than for
the judgment to be accurate. These two factors, acceptability and accuracy of a judgment, must
carefully be weighed in organizational judgment.
Organizational leaders may be aware of the recent literature on collective judgment and
action. In fact, the idea of collective accuracy has become so popular that leaders may have
heard of the research in the popular press. This popularity may instill a tendency for leaders to
use a large collective to make judgments. However, if that large collective is lacking in
knowledge, this approach can lead to inaccurate judgments. When leaders have a great deal of
expertise, and no one can be found with similar expertise, a leader may need to make an
important judgment independently of others in the organization. Another method a leader could
use is to educate a large collective so that they will have the knowledge necessary to help make a
judgment (Vroom, 2000).
If leaders do not have the knowledge to make a forecast themselves, they may have no
choice but to look to others in the organization to help make a forecast. One way to accomplish
this is to establish an internal prediction market. A prediction market allows individuals to make
“bets” on future events. These bets provide individuals with the incentive to provide accurate
judgments (Arrow et al., 2008). A study of an internal market at Hewlett Packard found that
small internal prediction markets, with only 26 participants, predicted printer sales with
significantly greater accuracy than official company forecasts (Chen & Plott, 2002).
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Leaders do not only have the option of asking employees for solutions, but also going
entirely outside the organization for solutions. With the advent of the Internet, the idea of letting
thousands of potential solvers work on a problem is no longer a theoretical question, but a
practical one. The practice of posting a problem on the Internet and asking for a solution is
referred to as crowdsourcing (Howe, 2005). Innocentive.com is a site on which companies can
post problems that they would like to have solved. An example problem taken from the site is:
Recovering Bacillus Spores from Swabs
TAGS: Life Sciences, Global Health, Food/Agriculture, Environment, RTP
AWARD: $30,000 USD | DEADLINE: 4/05/12 | ACTIVE SOLVERS: 38 |
POSTED: 1/05/12
The Seeker requires protocols for efficient recovery of bacterial spores (Bacillus
subtilis/Bacillus atrophaeus) from pre-wetted surface sampling tools with handle.
Guidance and standardized protocols are provided within the detailed challenge
description.
This is a Reduction-to-Practice Challenge that requires a written proposal and
experimental proof-of-concept data.
When posting the problem a company specifies what it will accept as demonstration of the
solution. These are sometimes replications of experimental results, or a theoretical evaluation of
the proposal by the seeker (Https://Www.innocentive.com/ar/challenge/9932938.).
Innocentive’s founding is described by the co-founder of the company in a recent paper (Lakhani
& Panetta, 2007). The idea for the company came from Alph Bingham, who was the Vice
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President of Research and Development at Eli Lilly. He observed in his doctoral program that
most scientific problems were amenable to multiple approaches and diverse solutions, and
excelling in one area of science was not a good indicator of success in other areas. Therefore,
opening the problem to individuals outside of the problem domain may lead to a solution.
Lakhani and Jeppesen (2007) found that 30% of the problems posted on Innocentive were
solved. They note that this is a high number given that these were problems that could not be
solved by scientists working for the company that posted them.
Another situation in which a leader should rely on a large collective is when a leader is
trying to solve a problem and potential solutions can be tested easily. In this case, it is a simple
matter of mathematics that the more potential solutions are identified, the more likely the
problem is to be solved (Lorge & Solomon, 1962). This is one instance in which a leader should
seek several solutions from a diverse collective of individuals, regardless of knowledge or
ability. More diverse individuals may provide more diverse solutions, covering more of the
solution space and leading to more likelihood of solving the problem. This technique must be
used carefully, however, because if too many incorrect solutions are proposed, identifying the
correct solution may become more difficult.
Implications for personnel selection. Employee selection often involves multiple
individuals, such as having several perspective employers interviewing a candidate
simultaneously (panel interviews) (Dixon, Wang, Calvin, Dineen, & Tomlinson, 2002), having
several perspective employers interview candidates serially (Dose, 2003), and having different
interviewers provide input to the final selection decision (Campion & Palmer, 1997). All three
of these areas are affected by the controversies over information sharing vs. independent
aggregation of information.
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A meta-analysis (McDaniel, Whetzel, Schmidt, & Maurer, 1994) indicated that panel
interviews were less valid predictors of job performance than individual interviews, but the
authors did not specify whether individual interviews were conducted by a single interviewer or
whether selections were made based on a series of individual interviews. A review (Dixon et al.,
2002) revealed that the validity of serial, panel, or single interviews was inconclusive. The same
review also considered the validity of two techniques for final selection of candidates. One
technique is to have individuals provide scores independently and then select the candidate with
the highest average score. A second method is to have several employers meet and attempt to
reach consensus. This review (Dixon et al., 2002) again found that previous research was
contradictory and inconclusive with regard to the validity of these two methods.
The inconclusive nature of these results is likely to have occurred because the lack of
careful consideration of the effect of information sharing vs. independence in the personnel
selection process. Information sharing increases knowledge, but may create bias that
independent judgments avoid. An interesting potential bias induced by information sharing is
discussing candidates between interviews, before all candidates have been interviewed (Campion
& Palmer, 1997). This discussion could create order effects, introduce irrelevant information,
and change standards for future candidates. Information sharing also may explain the
inconclusive results involving panel interviews. Panel interviews leverage a larger collective,
which would suggest that they would be more valid than a single one-on-one interview due to
increased reliability. However, a panel interview would suffer from the negative effects of live
interaction such as groupthink (Janis, 1972) and group polarization (Stoner, 1968). A series of
individual interviews may appear beneficial, but this may create too much information
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2009), and it may be difficult to combine all of
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this information when the final selection is made, especially if live discussion is used.
Attempting to reach consensus through discussion may also suffer from groupthink and group
polarization, and also may destroy unique information through conformity and by encouraging a
focus on shared rather than unique information (Stasser & Titus, 2003). For the final candidate
selection, rather than using consensus, information could be exchanged, but candidates could be
given independent numerical ratings.
Results from the current study suggest a compromise of sharing information but avoiding
the negative biasing effects of live interaction. Candidates should be interviewed separately by
several individuals. A Delphi technique (Rowe & Wright, 1999) should then be used to select
candidates. Information would be posted online anonymously to a discussion board, and
individuals could then provide an average rating for each candidate. Several rounds of
discussion and ratings would be solicited until the ratings changes were negligible. If this full
technique is not feasible, a single round of information sharing and rating could be used. The
candidate with the highest mean or median rating would then be selected. Future research is
necessary to test this hypothesized selection system.
Future research
Given such a discrepancy between the current and previous research, future research is
needed to determine further predictors of collective accuracy. Knowledge was shown to be the
key predictor of collective accuracy in the current study. When individuals possessed similar
knowledge, the collective was more likely to be accurate than when there were large differences
in knowledge. The key question that remains is how similar this knowledge must be in order for
the collective to be more accurate than a more knowledgeable subset. There also remains a
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question of how accurate a large collective will be if it contains individuals with a mix of
accurate and inaccurate information.
The effect of independence is another clear avenue for future research. Again, the current
results did not confirm previous results (Armstrong, 2006; Kahneman, 2011; Lorenz et al., 2011;
Makridakis et al., 2010a; Sunstein, 2006). In the current study dependence resulted in the
sharing of information with less knowledgeable individuals, leading to greater accuracy.
Therefore it may be expected that information sharing will increase accuracy when there is a
large difference in knowledge. However, when there is not a large difference in knowledge
information sharing may lead to bias or group polarization. These results would imply an
interaction in which information sharing increases the accuracy of judgments when there are
large differences in knowledge, but decrease accuracy when there are large similarities in
knowledge. This hypothesis requires further testing.
It is possible that part of the reason why the theory of collective accuracy was not
supported in the current study is because the collective accuracy associated with problem solving
was overgeneralized to judgment. There is strong theoretical and empirical evidence that
problems are more likely to be solved when several individuals suggest solutions (Lorge &
Solomon, 1962). However, given the results of the current set of experiments, it may be the case
that the area of collective problem solving is similar to the area of collective judgment and that
the efficacy of collective problem solving is also overstated. Collective problem solving will
only be accurate when solutions can be easily tested. Even if solutions can be easily tested, it is
possible that if too many solutions are tested, one may appear to solve the problem, but this may
occur only be chance, as occurs in the problems of overfitting and inflation of Type I error. It
could also be argued that in practical situations it is rare that solutions can be easily tested. One
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of the primary ways to verify that a solution to a scientific problem is correct is through
empirical tests such as experiments (Moser, 1987). If thousands of potential solutions are
generated, it may not be practical to test all of them by performing thousands of experiments.
We may therefore need to reduce the number of potential solutions to those that are most likely
to solve the problem, and this may require specialized knowledge. This situation is similar to
collective judgment, in which the current study has shown that a smaller, more knowledgeable
subset should be used rather than the entire collective. Like collective judgment, the efficacy of
collective problem solving may also be overstated.
Diversity is another avenue for future research. Contrary to prior research, the current set
of experiments indicated that more diverse judgments were less accurate. However, there is a
remaining question about the diversity of other factors in addition to the judgments themselves.
It has been suggested that collectives that contain individuals with diverse knowledge or diverse
perspectives may be more accurate than collectives without these diverse qualities (Armstrong,
2001a; Page, 2007). Given the strong results in the current study suggesting judgment diversity
leads to inaccuracy, these additional forms of diversity may also lead to inaccuracy. This is an
interesting hypothesis for future research.
Conclusion
Recent research touting the efficacy of large collectives should be viewed critically.
Collectives can be very accurate, but the current experiments indicate that this accuracy may
only occur when individuals in the collective all have very similar knowledge. Such a situation
may be the exception in practice, indicating that high collective accuracy may be a rare
phenomenon. A small set of knowledgeable experts will often be more accurate than a large
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collective of individuals. It may be more important to select a knowledgeable collective than a
large collective. Contrary to previous research (Lorenz et al., 2011; Page, 2007; Surowiecki,
2005), knowledge, rather than independence or diversity, is the most important factor predicting
collective accuracy. With knowledge as the most important predictor of accuracy, organizations
should focus on educating as many individuals as possible. Education and sharing of
information at all levels is the key to organizational success.
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Table 1
Unit of Measurement, True Values, Mean Judgments, and Errors for the Control and Dependent Conditions
for Sample One
Control
Target Event
U.S. GDP
China's GDP
Unemployment Rate
Retail Sales
Gas Price
Gold Price
Home Sales
Unemployment Claims
The Avengers Money
Men in Black Money
The Avengers Critics
Men in Black Critics
Dow
Apple
GE Market Cap
GM Market Cap

Unit
Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
$
Hundreds of $

Millions
Millions
Millions of $
Millions of $
Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
Billions of $
Billions of $

True
Value
2.2
8.1
8.1
-0.2
3.9
16.6
5.0
0.4
200.0
55.0
93.0
67.0
-6.2
-1.1
203.7
34.8

M
20.3
37.2
15.9
13.7
4.0
7.2
0.4
2.7
24.4
39.9
61.3
63.9
11.6
17.4
10.5
9.3

Errora
820%
359%
97%
6965%
4%
56%
92%
627%
88%
27%
34%
5%
286%
1679%
95%
73%

Dependent
n
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
23
22
24
24
24
24
24
24

M
22.9
32.5
13.0
22.2
4.5
7.1
0.1
0.2
22.9
26.3
67.6
68.9
16.2
21.2
33.4
23.5

Errora
940%
301%
60%
11220%
17%
57%
98%
48%
89%
52%
27%
3%
361%
2026%
84%
33%

a. Error expressed as a percentage: Absolute Value((Mean Judgment - True Value) / True Value) * 100

n
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
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Table 2
Unit of Measurement, True Values, Mean Judgments, and Errors for the Control and Dependent
Conditions for Sample Two
Control
Target Event
U.S. GDP
China's GDP
Unemployment Rate
Retail Sales
Gas Price
Gold Price
Home Sales
Unemployment Claims
The Avengers Money
Men in Black Money
The Avengers Critics
Men in Black Critics
Dow
Apple
GE Market Cap
GM Market Cap

Unit
Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
$
Hundreds of $

Millions
Millions
Millions of $
Millions of $
Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
Billions of $
Billions of $

True
Value
2.2
8.1
8.1
-0.2
3.9
16.6
5.0
0.4
200.0
55.0
93.0
67.0
-6.2
-1.1
203.7
34.8

M
13.5
29.6
16.3
6.7
4.1
6.2
0.1
3.4
26.8
21.5
59.5
48.8
15.8
10.7
19.8
16.7

Errora
514%
265%
101%
3425%
7%
62%
98%
813%
87%
61%
36%
27%
355%
1072%
90%
52%

Dependent
n
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
23
22
24
24
24
24
24
24

M
19.3
34.1
21.7
13.9
4.2
7.7
1.4
4.6
50.2
30.4
56.2
42.8
2.1
3.3
48.5
20.5

Errora
775%
321%
168%
7055%
8%
54%
71%
1141%
75%
45%
40%
36%
133%
395%
76%
41%

a. Error expressed as a percentage: Absolute Value((Mean Judgment - True Value) / True Value) *100

n
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
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Table 3
Collective Error (Deviation from the True Value) for the Highest Ranked, Highest
Three Ranked, and All Participants Combined

Target Event
U.S. GDP
China's GDP
Unemployment Rate
Retail Sales
Gold Price
Home Sales
The Avengers Critics
Men in Black Critics
Dow
Apple
GM Market Cap
Median
Times Most Accurate

Similar Predictiona
China's GDP
U.S. GDP
China's GDP
Unemployment Rate
GE Market Cap
Dow
Men in Black Critics
The Avengers Critics
Apple
Dow
U.S. GDP

rb
.55
.55
.34
.22
.27
.23
.61
.61
.60
.60
.41

Collective Error
Highest
Highest
Three
All
2.80
1.47 17.03
4.9 25.45
3.9
3.90
1.90 8.58
21.87 14.50
10.20
15.75
5.66 9.47
4.96
4.60 4.45
33.67 31.75
28.00
12.33 10.30
5.00
9.87 17.59
9.20
11.10
7.43 14.58
34.81
33.64 17.63
9.20
5

7.43 14.58
4
2

Note. Predictions were excluded if no similar prediction was significantly correlated
with the target event. Bold values were the most accurate for each prediction.
a. Prediction used to rank participants on accuracy.
b. Correlation between accuracy of the prediction and accuracy on a similar prediction.
All correlations are significant at the p < .05 level.
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Table 4

Results of Significance Tests Comparing Median Individual Error in the Control and Dependent Conditions
Sample 1
Sample 2
Control Dependent
More
Condition Condition
Target Event
p accurate
Error
Error
U.S. GDP
19.3
12.8 0.74
China's GDP
26.9
21.9 0.67
Unemployment Rate
2.0
5.1 0.72
Retail Sales
10.2
20.2 0.12
Gas Price
0.3
0.6 0.01 Control
Gold Price
13.5
11.6 0.17
Home Sales
4.9
4.9 0.47
Unemployment Claims
0.3
0.2 0.00 Dep.
The Avengers Money
189.0
185.0 0.22
Men in Black Money
50.0
38.0 0.03 Dep.
The Avengers Critics
23.0
23.0 0.95
Men in Black Critics
12.5
7.0 0.04 Dep.
Dow
11.2
21.2 0.05
Apple
10.1
21.1 0.07
GE Market Cap
204.0
200.0 0.00 Dep.
GM Market Cap
34.8
32.3 0.00 Dep.

Control
Condition
Error
2.8
6.9
4.9
5.2
0.3
15.6
4.9
0.4
190.0
45.0
28.0
13.0
11.2
7.1
204.0
34.8

Dependent
Condition
Error
15.8
27.4
3.5
9.2
0.3
9.2
3.5
4.6
154.5
30.0
36.5
28.0
8.2
4.1
150.0
19.8

p
0.19
0.47
0.84
0.33
0.59
0.16
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.37
0.16
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02

More
accurate

Dep.
Control
Dep.
Dep.

Dep.
Dep.
Dep.
Dep.
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Table 5
Results of Significance Tests Comparing Median Collective Error in the Control and Dependent Conditions
Sample 1
Sample 2

Target Event
U.S. GDP
China's GDP
Unemployment Rate
Retail Sales
Gas Price
Gold Price
Home Sales
Unemployment Claims
The Avengers Money
Men in Black Money
The Avengers Critics
Men in Black Critics
Dow
Apple
GE Market Cap
GM Market Cap

Control
Condition
Error
15.3
26.9
1.8
10.2
0.2
12.8
4.9
0.3
190.0
43.7
23.0
3.0
11.2
10.1
203.6
34.8

Dependent
Condition
Error
12.8
21.9
3.9
20.2
0.6
11.6
4.9
0.2
185.0
37.0
23.0
3.0
21.2
21.1
199.7
32.0

p
0.90
0.73
0.59
0.02
0.00
0.42
0.47
0.39
0.22
0.18
0.95
0.78
0.05
0.07
0.00
0.00

More
accurate

Control
Control

Dep.
Dep.

Control
Condition
Error
2.7
6.9
4.9
2.5
0.2
15.6
4.9
0.2
191.0
43.0
28.0
7.0
11.6
7.1
203.7
34.8

Dependent
Condition
Error
15.8
27.4
2.9
9.2
0.3
9.2
3.5
4.6
154.5
27.5
36.5
28.0
8.2
4.1
149.7
17.3

p
0.14
0.32
0.89
0.02
0.47
0.17
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.37
0.39
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.02

More
accurate

Control

Dep.
Dep.
Dep.

Dep.
Dep.
Dep.
Dep.
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Table 6
Aggregate Mean Judgments as a Function of Time for Sample One
Time perioda
True
Target Event
score
1
2
3
4
U.S. GDP
China's GDP
Unemployment Rate
Retail Sales
Gas Price
Gold Price
Home Sales
Unemployment Claims
The Avengers Money
Men in Black Money
The Avengers Critics
Men in Black Critics
Dow
Apple
GE Market Cap
GM Market Cap

2.2
8.1
8.1
-0.2
3.9
16.6
5.0
0.4
200.0
55.0
93.0
67.0
-6.2
-1.1
203.7
34.8

12.8
18.8
10.5
9.0
3.9
4.3
0.2
0.5
7.5
14.3
79.8
81.3
15.8
12.0
1.4
1.0

Control condition
17.7 19.9
20.4
30.0 29.2
30.8
9.4 11.2
11.5
16.6 21.1
17.4
3.9
4.0
4.0
2.6
6.7
6.9
0.3
0.7
0.6
1.0
0.7
2.9
10.3 13.1
22.1
12.8 46.7
50.1
68.0 55.6
63.2
77.6 64.5
64.3
12.1
9.6
7.8
13.0 12.0
11.9
0.8 18.7
15.7
0.5 18.6
13.8

5

6

22.2
35.5
11.9
17.2
4.0
7.2
0.5
3.1
27.4
46.9
62.9
66.6
11.7
17.0
12.6
11.1

20.3
37.2
16.0
13.8
4.0
7.2
0.4
2.7
24.5
39.9
61.3
63.9
11.6
17.4
10.5
9.3

rb
0.83*
0.91*
0.84*
0.29
0.91*
0.81*
0.48
0.86*
0.94*
0.73*
-0.65
-0.83*
-0.48
0.80*
0.56
0.51

Dependent Condition
U.S. GDP
2.2
11.3 20.8 19.9
25.8
24.0
22.9
0.77*
China's GDP
8.1
40.3 39.5 36.1
32.5
32.2
32.5 -0.93*
Unemployment Rate
8.1
12.0 14.1 13.1
13.4
13.4
13.0
0.24
Retail Sales
-0.2
31.5 29.1 27.3
23.7
22.7
22.2 -0.97*
Gas Price
3.9
5.1
4.7
4.6
4.6
4.5
4.5
-0.84*
Gold Price
16.6
4.7
4.8
5.9
6.5
6.4
7.1
0.96*
Home Sales
5.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.72
Unemployment Claims
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.83*
The Avengers Money
200.0
18.8 19.3 18.2
17.3
16.7
22.9
0.30
Men in Black Money
55.0
13.8 15.3 15.5
17.9
17.9
26.3
0.87*
The Avengers Critics
93.0
67.0 68.4 66.7
67.6
66.9
67.6 -0.03
Men in Black Critics
67.0
78.3 74.0 73.4
71.5
70.8
68.9 -0.96*
Dow
-6.2
19.0 19.0 17.2
17.6
16.4
16.2 -0.93*
Apple
-1.1
25.0 23.8 21.5
20.4
20.0
21.2 -0.85*
GE Market Cap
203.7
2.5
2.1
3.9
17.1
16.3
33.4
0.92*
GM Market Cap
34.8
2.5
2.4
2.4
22.3
22.8
23.5
0.89*
a. Aggregate mean judgments include the noted time period and all previous time periods combined.
b. Correlation between time period and mean judgment.
* indicates p < .05.

121
Table 7
Aggregate Mean Judgments as a Function of Time for Sample Two
Time perioda
Target Event
U.S. GDP
China's GDP
Unemployment Rate
Retail Sales
Gas Price
Gold Price
Home Sales
Unemployment Claims
The Avengers Money
Men in Black Money
The Avengers Critics
Men in Black Critics
Dow
Apple
GE Market Cap
GM Market Cap

True
score
2.2
8.1
8.1
-0.2
3.9
16.6
5.0
0.4
200.0
55.0
93.0
67.0
-6.2
-1.1
203.7
34.8

1
6.7
39.3
20.7
5.0
4.1
7.7
0.1
1.8
6.3
12.0
50.0
33.3
12.3
21.7
1.3
1.0

2

3

4

5

Control condition
14.0
19.9
14.8
31.4
42.5
34.4
21.7
19.0
17.6
0.6
1.2
2.1
4.1
4.2
4.1
6.0
4.4
5.4
0.0
0.0
0.1
3.0
2.1
3.4
19.0
13.2
17.0
16.3
12.4
12.7
52.7
57.9
61.1
42.9
46.0
49.7
7.5
8.6
6.9
13.0
11.3
9.3
0.7
0.6
8.1
0.4
0.3
16.2

13.5
29.6
16.3
6.6
4.1
6.2
0.1
3.4
26.8
21.5
59.5
48.8
15.8
10.7
19.8
16.7

rb
0.48
-0.48
-0.92*
0.29
-0.56
-0.46
0.84*
0.76
0.82*
0.60
0.92*
0.90*
0.27
-0.82*
0.85*
0.86*

Dependent condition
U.S. GDP
2.2
26.3
22.3
20.3
18.0
19.3
-0.89*
41.3
39.7
35.4
34.1
-0.98*
China's GDP
8.1
42.5
Unemployment Rate
8.1
30.8
23.5
23.3
23.1
21.8
-0.81*
12.9
11.1
10.1
13.9
-0.47
Retail Sales
-0.2
16.0
Gas Price
3.9
4.0
3.9
4.0
4.2
4.2
0.94*
7.2
7.0
8.2
7.7
0.21
Gold Price
16.6
7.8
Home Sales
5.0
1.6
1.7
1.7
1.5
1.4
-0.59
5.2
5.1
4.8
4.6
-0.07
Unemployment Claims
0.4
4.4
The Avengers Money
200.0
31.0
34.3
37.3
41.8
50.2
0.97*
Men in Black Money
55.0
22.2
26.8
27.6
31.3
30.4
0.92*
The Avengers Critics
93.0
49.0
50.3
51.4
54.3
56.2
0.99*
Men in Black Critics
67.0
44.3
40.6
37.3
38.1
42.8
-0.29
Dow
-6.2
2.3
2.4
1.8
1.8
2.1
-0.51
2.4
3.0
3.3
3.4
0.95*
Apple
-1.1
1.8
GE Market Cap
203.7
57.5
56.7
56.9
51.0
48.5
-0.91*
27.3
24.6
21.7
20.5
0.28
GM Market Cap
34.8
12.9
a. Aggregate mean judgments include the noted time period and all previous time periods combined.
a. Correlation between time period and mean judgment.
* indicates p < .05.
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Table 8
Results of Significance Tests Between SDs in the Control and Dependent Conditions
Sample 1
Sample 2

U.S. GDP
China's GDP
Unemployment Rate
Retail Sales
Gas Price
Gold Price
Home Sales
Unemployment Claims
The Avengers Money
Men in Black Money
The Avengers Critics
Men in Black Critics
Dow
Apple
GE Market Cap
GM Market Cap

Control Dependent
Condition Condition
SD
SD
26.16
24.70
25.10
15.11
24.14
0.33
7.93
1.02
8.03
39.26
63.94
28.03
25.39
14.32
20.05
41.38
40.74

14.54
6.57
13.16
0.89
5.14
0.11
0.08
30.74
40.69
12.92
10.23
12.78
12.50
89.18
64.43

p
0.43
0.00*
0.07
0.14
0.12
0.02*
0.02*
0.01*
0.20
0.03*
0.00*
0.01*
0.55
0.14
0.09
0.40

Control Dependent
Condition Condition
SD
SD
19.92
18.07
28.68
8.40
22.97
0.38
7.26
0.13
6.59
47.18
30.18
22.04
22.63
26.28
10.26
53.51
49.64

22.94
18.94
18.23
0.41
4.15
1.13
3.22
33.24
19.28
20.98
21.73
2.21
1.46
44.78
27.09

Note. For all significant differences the control condition SD is significantly higher than dependent
condition SD.
* indicates p < .05.

p
0.32
0.16
0.00*
0.75
0.84
0.00*
0.00*
0.04*
0.44
0.42
0.80
0.65
0.00*
0.00*
0.59
0.24
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Table 9
Design and Number of Participants in Each Condition in Experiment 2
No overconfidence information
0-cues
2-recent cues
2-long cues
4-cues

0-trials
27
22
27
28

2-trials
26
26
21
27

0-cues
2-recent cues
2-long cues
4-cues

Overconfidence information
0-trials
2-trials
22
18
26
23
25
18
22
24

5-trials
24
27
29
28

5-trials
27
35
19
26
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Table 10
Unit of Measurement, True Values, Mean Judgments, and Errors in the Combined Control and Experimental
Conditions
Control
True
Target Event
Unit
Value
M Errora
n
3.94
Ground Beef Prices
$
3.48
13% 50
4.06
Gas Prices
$
3.86
5% 50
12.19
Unemployment Rate
Percent
7.80
56% 50
19.67 1477% 50
New Unemployment
Millions
1.25
8.22 311% 49
GDP Change
Percent
2.00
2.61
Northeast Home Prices
Thousands of $
1.78
47% 50
2.11
Midwest Home Prices
Thousands of $
1.01
109% 50
1.84
South Home Prices
Thousands of $
1.27
45% 50
2.57
West Home Prices
Thousands of $
1.88
37% 50
8.01 254% 50
3M Stock Change
Percent
-5.22
14.74
Apple Stock Change
Percent
-10.76
237% 50
8.77 221% 50
GE Stock Change
Percent
-7.27
7.36 280% 50
Microsoft Stock Change
Percent
-4.10
7.37 3337% 50
Jackson Touchdowns
Touchdowns/game
0.21
8.44 1082% 50
Turner Touchdowns
Touchdowns/game
0.71
5.94 1386% 50
McGahee Touchdowns
Touchdowns/game
0.40
5.46 855% 50
Gore Touchdowns
Touchdowns/game
0.57
a. Error expressed as a percentage: Absolute Value((Mean Judgment - True Value) / True
Value) * 100

Experimental
M
3.45
3.86
8.45
1.35
1.84
1.65
1.01
1.34
1.73
1.76
4.57
2.77
1.11
0.43
0.70
0.41
0.55

Errora
1%
0%
8%
9%
8%
8%
0%
5%
8%
134%
142%
138%
127%
100%
2%
3%
4%

n
553
553
553
553
553
553
553
553
553
553
553
553
553
553
552
552
548
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Table 11
Collective Error (Deviation from the True Value) for the Highest Ranked, Highest Three Ranked, and All
Participants Combined
Control
Target Event
Ground Beef Prices
Unemployment Rate
GDP Change
Northeast Home Prices
Midwest Home Prices
South Home Prices
West Home Prices
3M Stock Change
Apple Stock Change
GE Stock Change
Microsoft Stock Change
Jackson Touchdowns
Turner Touchdowns
McGahee Touchdowns
Gore Touchdowns

Similar
Predictiona
Unemp. Rate
GDP Change
Unemp. Rate
Midwest Home
South Home
West Home
South Home
South Home
GE Stock
Micro. Stock
GE Stock
Turner T.D.s
McGahee T.D.s
Gore T.D.s
McGahee T.D.s

rb Highest
20.20
.34
.57
2.80
.57
6.20
.80
10.75
.75
.57
.72
22.00
.72
49.00
27.00
.33
18.00
.44
.88
7.20
.88
4.00
.89
.29
.89
.09
.02
.61
.61
.03

Highest
Three
All
5.20
4.56
.72 11.87
9.53 11.65
13.45 25.54
6.22
.08
31.30 82.88
75.70 110.04
3.60 56.74
4.60 69.36
11.60 16.07
8.00 11.46
.32
7.15
7.73
.04
5.54
.01
.08
4.88

Experimental
rb Highest
.23
.30
.28
.30
.28
6.30
.39
13.10
.28
.90
.33
39.00
.33
5.00
.22
.00
.31
4.00
.16
1.40
.16
10.70
.31
.01
.41
.29
.42
.20
.42
.07

Median
4.00
3.60 11.46
Number Most Accurate
8
6
1c
Note. Predictions were excluded if no similar prediction was significantly correlated
with the target event. Bold values were the most accurate for each prediction.
a. Prediction used to rank participants on accuracy.
b. Correlation between accuracy of the prediction and accuracy on a similar prediction.
All correlations are significant at the p < .05 level.
c. The number of times the "all" category was most accurate was significantly greater
in the experimental than the control conditions, p = .04.

.90
6

Highest
Three
.30
.37
6.33
11.97
.73
23.00
5.30
3.70
6.30
1.43
3.47
.22
.16
.15
.04

All
.28
.65
6.96
15.37
.16
13.50
.41
6.52
14.56
10.04
10.07
.21
.01
.01
.02

1.43
2

.41
7c
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Table 12
Individual Error (Deviation from the True Value) and SDs for Judgments from the Combined
Experimental Conditions and Combined Control Conditions
Control
Target Event
Ground Beef Prices
Gas Prices
Unemployment Rate
New Unemployment
GDP Change
Northeast Home Prices
Midwest Home Prices
South Home Prices
West Home Prices
3M Stock Change
Apple Stock Change
GE Stock Change
Microsoft Stock Change
Jackson Touchdowns
Turner Touchdowns
McGahee Touchdowns
Gore Touchdowns

n
50
50
50
50
49
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50

Error
1.26
0.35
4.81
18.52
7.09
1.08
1.21
0.85
1.09
13.23
26.27
16.04
12.89
7.16
7.81
5.58
4.91

Experimental
SD
1.13
0.41
9.54
49.07
11.56
1.22
1.46
0.81
1.27
13.52
26.29
11.42
11.81
7.39
8.88
7.51
7.15

n
553
553
553
553
553
553
553
553
553
553
553
553
553
553
552
552
548

Error
0.14
0.14
0.67
0.13
0.50
0.22
0.07
0.08
0.19
6.99
15.33
10.13
5.63
0.23
0.17
0.13
0.20

SD
0.23
0.12
1.10
0.30
0.90
0.19
0.12
0.08
0.14
1.64
3.92
4.43
6.28
0.49
0.38
0.32
0.65

Note. Error is significantly lower in the experimental groups for all judgments at the p < .05 level.
SD is significantly higher in control conditions for all judgments at the p < .05 level.
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Table 13

Correlations Between Condition Mean
Judgment Error and Condition SD
Target Event
Ground Beef Prices
Gas Prices
Unemployment Rate
New Unemployment
GDP Change
Northeast Home Prices
Midwest Home Prices
South Home Prices
West Home Prices
3M Stock Change
Apple Stock Change
GE Stock Change
Microsoft Stock Change
Jackson Touchdowns
Turner Touchdowns
McGahee Touchdowns
Gore Touchdowns
Note. N = 22.
* indicates p < .05.

r
.31
-.10
.95*
.95*
-.14
.10
.75*
.09
-.38
.00
-.27
-.28
-.15
.96*
.84*
.94*
.85*
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Table 14
Collective Errors of Means, Medians, and Modes of Judgments
Control
Target Event
Ground Beef Prices
Gas Prices
Unemployment Rate
New Unemployment
GDP Change
Northeast Home Prices
Midwest Home Prices
South Home Prices
West Home Prices
3M Stock Change
Apple Stock Change
GE Stock Change
Microsoft Stock Change
Jackson Touchdowns
Turner Touchdowns
McGahee Touchdowns
Gore Touchdowns
Number most accurate

Experimental

Mean Median Mode
0.48
0.46
0.16
0.19
0.20
0.14
4.39
0.30
0.20
18.42
4.45
1.75
1.90
6.22
1.00
82.88
59.50 72.00
110.04
83.50 49.00
56.74
33.05 27.00
69.36
42.00 112.00
13.23
8.22
8.22
25.50
15.93 14.76
11.52 10.27
16.04
7.80
11.46
6.10
5.79
7.15
0.79
7.73
5.29
0.29
5.54
2.60
0.60
4.88
1.43
1.43
0

4

12

Note. Bold values are the most accurate in the condition.

Mean Median
0.03
0.03
0.01
0.00
0.65
0.40
0.11
0.05
0.20
0.16
18.00
13.50
1.00
0.41
6.52
5.00
14.56
14.00
6.98
6.72
15.76
15.33
10.67
10.04
6.10
5.21
0.21
0.19
0.06
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.17
0.02
10

2

Mode
0.03
0.06
0.20
0.05
0.50
28.00
1.00
3.00
18.00
6.22
15.76
12.27
6.10
0.19
0.11
0.10
0.17
3
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Table 15
Standardized Betas for Regression Equations Predicting Judgment Accuracy
Target Event
Ground Beef Prices
Gas Prices
Unemployment Rate
New Unemployment
GDP Change
Northeast Home Prices
Midwest Home Prices
South Home Prices
West Home Prices
3M Stock Change
Apple Stock Change
GE Stock Change
Microsoft Stock Change
Jackson Touchdowns
Turner Touchdowns
McGahee Touchdowns
Gore Touchdowns

Knowledge
0.02
0.13*
-0.03
-0.04
0.02
-0.01
0.00
-0.02
0.00
-0.15*
0.00
0.05
0.00
0.07
-0.02
0.02
-0.01

Similar prediction
0.32*
0.20*
0.68*
0.39*
0.12*
0.02
0.54*
0.39*
0.31*
-0.05
0.11*
0.11*
0.11*
0.18*
0.43*
0.08
0.19*

Note. Each event was predicted by knowledge, similar prediction,
and confidence in a single regression equation.
* indicates p < .05.

Confidence
-0.06
-0.01
0.03
0.02
-0.02
-0.02
0.02
0.09
0.04
-0.04
-0.11*
-0.05
0.01
0.04
0.01
-0.03
0.06
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Table 16
Mean (SD, N) standardized judgment accuracy scores by condition
No overconfidence information
5-trials
0.03 (0.27, 24)
0.16 (0.08, 27)
0.18 (0.08, 29)
0.15 (0.06, 28)
0.13 (0.15, 108)

Total
-0.56 (1.20, 77)
0.15 (0.13, 75)
0.15 (0.12, 77)
0.16 (0.06, 83)
-0.02 (0.67, 312)

0-cues
2-recent cues

0-trials
-1.19 (0.67, 22)
0.12 (0.05, 26)

Overconfidence information
5-trials
2-trials
0.15 (0.14, 18)
0.09 (0.20, 27)
0.17 (0.07, 23)
0.18 (0.09, 35)

Total
-0.31 (0.74, 67)
0.16 (0.08, 84)

2-long cues
4-cues
Total

0.03 (0.19, 25)
0.14 (0.08, 22)
-0.20 (0.64, 95)

0.20 (0.06, 18)
0.19 (0.06, 24)
0.18 (0.08, 83)

0.20 (0.09, 19)
0.19 (0.12, 26)
0.16 (0.14, 107)

0.13 (0.16, 62)
0.17 (0.09, 72)
0.05 (0.42, 285)

Total
2-trials
5-trials
0.13 (0.17, 44)
0.06 (0.23, 51)
0.17 (0.14, 49)
0.17 (0.08, 62)
0.20 (0.07, 39)
0.19 (0.09, 48)
0.19 (0.06, 51)
0.17 (0.09, 54)
0.17 (0.12, 183)b
0.15 (0.15, 215)c

Total
-0.44 (1.02, 144)z
0.15 (0.10, 159)x
0.14 (0.14, 139)x
0.17 (0.08, 155)x
0.01 (0.57, 597)

0-cues
2-recent cues
2-long cues
4-cues
Total

0-cues
2-recent cues
2-long cues
4-cues
Total

0-trials
-1.72 (1.39, 27)
0.10 (0.07, 22)
0.08 (0.15, 27)
0.13 (0.06, 28)
-0.37 (1.07, 104)

0-trials
-1.48 (1.15, 49)
0.11 (0.06, 48)
0.05 (0.17, 52)
0.13 (0.07, 50)
-0.29 (0.89, 199)a

2-trials
0.11 (0.20, 26)
0.17 (0.19, 26)
0.20 (0.07, 21)
0.20 (0.05, 27)
0.17 (0.15, 100)

Note. Means in each row or column that do not share subscripts differ significantly
at the p < .05 level.
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Table 17
ANOVA on Accuracy: 3 (trials: 0, 2, 5) x 4 (cues: zero, 2 recent, 2 long, 4) x 2
(overconfidence information, no overconfidence information)
Source
Df
F
η2
Trials
2 69.05 0.19
Cues
3 41.40 0.18
Overconfidence Information
1
4.39 0.01
Trials x Cues
6 18.09 0.16
Trials x Overconfidence Information
2
1.43 0.01
Cues x Overconfidence Information
3
1.64 0.01
Trials x Cues x Overconfidence Information
6
0.78 0.01
Error
573

p
< .001
< .001
0.04
< .001
0.24
0.18
0.58
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Appendix A
Experiment 1 sample procedure

Please write the three digit code that you were emailed.
Code:

We are going to ask you to make a series of predictions. Please use all of your personal
knowledge, intuitions, and reasoning ability to make the predictions. Please do not look up
additional information as you are making predictions. You will be provided with the average
response from other participants who have already made these same predictions. Please feel free
to use that information if you wish. It's up to you.

When asked for numbers please write only numbers and not symbols like % or $. Feel free to
use decimals or not. You can input positive numbers (like 5.0) or negative numbers (like -5.0).

When reported on April 27, what do you think the percentage growth in real GDP of the U.S.
over last year will be? (Real GDP is basically the total economic output of the U.S., a major
indicator of how the economy is performing.) The average of previous participants in this study
was 18.0 based on 16 participants.
percentage, 0.0 - 100.0:
What is your percentage of confidence in this prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to 100.

When reported for the first quarter of 2012, what do you think the percentage growth in real
GDP in China over last year will be? (Real GDP is basically the total economic output of China,
a major indicator of how the economy is performing.) The average of previous participants in
this study was 35.5 based on 16 participants.
percentage, 0.0 - 100.0:

What is your percentage of confidence in this prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to 100.

133

When reported at the beginning of this May what do you think the unemployment rate will be, in
terms of percent? The average of previous participants in this study was 23.0 based on 16
participants.
percentage, 0.0 - 100.0:

What is your percentage of confidence in this prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to 100.

By what percentage will total retail sales in the U.S. change from the month of April to May
(type in a positive or negative number). The average of previous participants in this study was
10.1 based on 16 participants.
percentage, 0.0 - 100.0:

What is your percentage of confidence in this prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to 100.

When measured early this May, what do you think the price of gasoline will be per gallon on
average for the U.S.? The average of previous participants in this study was 4.15 based on 16
participants.
Price in dollars and cents: example: 0.00

What is your percentage of confidence in this prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to 100.

On May 1, what will be the price of one ounce of gold? The average of previous participants in
this study was 815 based on 16 participants.
Price in dollars and cents: example: 0.00

What is your percentage of confidence in this prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to 100.
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How many homes will be sold in the U.S. for the month of April? The average of previous
participants in this study was 1,484,475 based on 16 participants.
total homes:

What is your percentage of confidence in this prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to 100.

How many individuals will claim unemployment in the U.S. in April? The average of previous
participants in this study was 4,796,093 based on 16 participants.
total individuals:

What is your percentage of confidence in this prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to 100.

How much money, in millions, will the movie "The Avengers" make in its opening weekend
(Friday, Saturday, and Sunday)? The average of previous participants in this study was 41.8
based on 16 participants.
Millions

What is your percentage of confidence in this prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to 100.

How much money, in millions, will the movie "Men In Black 3" make in its opening weekend
(Friday, Saturday, and Sunday)? The average of previous participants in this study was 31.3
based on 16 participants.
Millions

What is your percentage of confidence in this prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to 100.
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What will be the rating that top critics on the website "Rotten Tomatoes" give the movie "The
Avengers?" The average of previous participants in this study was 54.3 based on 16 participants.
Percentage positive (0 to 100)

What is your percentage of confidence in this prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to 100.

What will be the rating that top critics on the website "Rotten Tomatoes" give the movie "Men in
Black 3?" The average of previous participants in this study was 38.1 based on 16 participants.
Percentage positive (0 to 100)

What is your percentage of confidence in this prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to 100.

For the month of May, what will be the percentage change of the Dow Jones Industrial Average
(DJIA, the main stock market)? The average of previous participants in this study was 1.7 based
on 16 participants.
% change:

What is your percentage of confidence in this prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to 100.

For the month of May, what will be the percentage change of the computer company "Apple's"
stock. The average of previous participants in this study was 3.2 based on 16 participants.
% change:

What is your percentage of confidence in this prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to 100.
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What will be the market capitalization (total value of all stock) of General Electric on May 1?
The average of previous participants in this study was 51,008,103,125 based on 16 participants.
Total Value:

What is your percentage of confidence in this prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to 100.

What will be the market capitalization (total value of all stock) of General Motors on May 1?
The average of previous participants in this study was 21,676,542,847 based on 16 participants.
Total value:

What is your percentage of confidence in this prediction? Please enter a number from 0 to 100.
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Individual difference measures:

What is your gender?
 Female
 Male
What is your major?

Taking the good with the bad, how happy and contented are you on the average now, compared
with other people?






the lowest 5% of the population
the lower 30%
the middle 30%
the upper 30%
the highest 5% of the population

Please rate your usual style of thinking on the following scale






Highly Intuitive
Somewhat Intuitive
Equally Intuitive and Analytical
Somewhat Analytical
Highly Analytical

Please rate your preferred style of thinking on the following scale






Highly Intuitive
Somewhat Intuitive
Equally Intuitive and Analytical
Somewhat Analytical
Highly Analytical

Isaiah Berlin classified intellectuals as hedgehogs or foxes. The hedgehog knows one big thing
and tries to explain as much as possible within that conceptual framework, whereas the fox
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knows many small things and is content to improvise explanations on a case by case basis. I
place myself toward the hedgehog or fox end of this scale:
 Hedgehog



 Uncertain



 Fox
I think politics is more cloudlike than clocklike ("cloudlike" meaning inherently unpredictable,
"clocklike" meaning perfectly predictable if we have adequate knowledge).
 Clocklike



 Uncertain



 Cloudlike
When considering most conflicts, I can usually see how both sides could be right.
 Completely Disagree



 Uncertain



 Completely Agree
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Free markets are the best path to prosperity.
 Completely Disagree



 Uncertain



 Completely Agree
I see an irreversible trend toward global economic interdependence.
 Completely Disagree



 Uncertain



 Completely Agree
I am optimistic about the long-term growth trajectory of the world economy.
 Completely Disagree



 Uncertain



 Completely Agree
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What was your score on the SAT verbal (critical reading) section? (Please leave blank if you
didn't take this test or can't remember).
Score

What was your score on the SAT mathematics section? (Please leave blank if you didn't take
this test or can't remember).
Score
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Appendix B
Experiment 2 sample procedure
Please enter the three digit code that you were emailed so that we can give you credit for
participating.

In this study you will be asked to make predictions and asked about your confidence in the
predictions. The individuals with the most accurate predictions, weighted by confidence, will be
awarded a $150 gift certificate. The opinion questions at the end of the study will not figure in to
the gift certificate calculations. Two certificates will be awarded. If you win, which gift
certificate do you want?
 Amazon.com
 Apple
 UConn Co-op
Please type your predicted values into the small boxes on this page. Please just use numbers, do
not use symbols like % or $. You may need to use decimals in some cases.

How much does ground beef cost per pound?
How much does regular unleaded gas cost per gallon?
What was the unemployment rate in percent in August of this year?
How many individuals who were looking for their first job were still unemployed last August
(answer in millions)?
What is the average yearly GDP growth over the last 20 years?
How much is the national average home price?
How much did the stock price of General Electric increase per year over the last 20 years?
How many touchdowns did Michael Turner score last season (2011 season)?
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This study is going to ask you to make predictions about the value of certain future events
(unemployment rate, number of touchdowns thrown by Tom Brady, etc.). You will be given a
series of variables that you can use to predict that value (see table below). Your job is to try to
use this information, along with any personal knowledge you might have, to try to predict the
next value. In some cases all of the variables may be useful, in some cases only a few may be
useful, and in some cases there won’t be much of a pattern at all. If there is no pattern at all, it
may be wise to simply use the long term average (usually shown in the last column), because that
may be the best guess. In some cases you may learn more after making a few guesses. As a
simple example, below is the U.S. population in millions:

the guess for August 2012 might be around 314.3, because there seems to be a minor upward
trend.

Individuals tend to be overconfident in their estimates. One way to avoid overconfidence is to
think of reasons why your estimate may not be correct. Please rate your confidence carefully.

Please type your answers into the small boxes on the following pages. Please just use numbers,
do not use symbols like % or $. Please do not look up any additional information when making
your predictions.
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Next page:

Next page:

Next page:
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Next page:

Next page:
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Individual difference measures:

What is your gender?
 Female
 Male
What is your major?

Taking the good with the bad, how happy and contented are you on the average now, compared
with other people?






the lowest 5% of the population
the lower 30%
the middle 30%
the upper 30%
the highest 5% of the population

I tend to agree with Democratic politicians on most issues.






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

I tend to agree with Republican politicians on most issues.






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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The hedgehog knows one big thing and tries to explain as much as possible within that
conceptual framework, whereas the fox knows many small things and is content to improvise
explanations on a case by case basis. I am like a fox:






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Free markets are the best path to prosperity.






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

I think rich people make most of their money by exploiting people.






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

I am optimistic about the long-term growth trajectory of the world economy.






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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I am worried that environmental problems will eventually lead to disastrous consequences.






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

I think that in general the condition of the world improves as time moves on.






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

I am an optimistic person.






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

I think that most events in life are determined by chance forces that no one can control.






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

I see myself as dependable, self-disciplined.






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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I see myself as disorganized, careless.






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

I am good at coming up with explanations for why things have occurred.






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

I am good at predicting things.






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

I am knowledgeable about professional football.






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

I am knowledgeable about economics.






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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What position does Adrian Peterson play?






Wide Receiver
Running Back
Quaterback
Tight End
I don't know

Which economist first came up with the idea of stimulating the economy through spending?






Hayek
Keynes
Friedman
Reagan
I don't know

What was your score on the SAT verbal (critical reading) section? (Please leave blank if you
didn't take this test or can't remember).
 Score
What was your score on the SAT mathematics section? (Please leave blank if you didn't take
this test or can't remember).
 Score
I think the predictions I made in this study were accurate.






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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I put a lot of effort into this study.






Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Please hit the next button (on the bottom right) to submit your survey.

